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Article 3

Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Cases:
Recovery on Behalf of a Class
Kevin M. Forde*
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the occurrence of mass torts has increased
dramatically. A mass tort is the phenomenon where numerous
persons suffer the same or similar kinds of injuries resulting
from another individual's or entity's action, course of conduct, or
product.1 Such occurrences generally spawn a multiplicity of
lawsuits against the tortfeasor. Moreover, the increasing frequency of such occurrences has led to an explosion in the area of
complex mass tort litigation.
In the last twenty years, numerous incidents have given rise to
mass tort litigation. Such litigation is especially common in the
area of products liability. The MER/29 litigation 2 in the late

B.S. 1960, Marquette University; J.D. 1963, Loyola University of Chicago School of
Law; Fellow, International Academy of Trial Lawyers. The author is a past president
of the Chicago Bar Association, past editor-in-chief of the Chicago Bar Record and
received the Loyola University of Chicago School of Law Alumni Medal of Excellence
in 1982. He has participated in many major tort and class action cases and is the
principal drafter of the Illinois Class Action Statute. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 2-801
(1983).
The author wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Mary Gilhooly, a former
member of the Loyola University of Chicago Law Journal and Lou Ann Reichle,
symposium editor, in the preparation of this article.
1. See generally Putz & Astiz, Punitive Damage Claims of Class Members Who Opt
Out: Should They Survive? 16 U.S.F.L. REV. 1 (1981); Note, Mass Liability and Punitive
Damages Overkill, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1797 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, Mass Liability]; Note, Punitive Damages, the Common Question Class Action, and the Concept of
Overkill, 13 PAC. L.J. 1273 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Punitive Damages]. "Mass
tort," as used in this article, refers to both mass accidents and mass products liability
litigation. See also Williams, 98 F.R.D. 323, 324 n.1 (1983); Note, Class Certification in
Mass Accident Cases Under Rule 23(b)(1), 96 HARV. L. REV. 1143 (1983) [hereinafter cited
as Note, Class Certification].
2. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967); Toole v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967). See also Rheingold, The MER/29 Story-An Instance of Successful Mass DisasterLitigation,56 CAuF.
L. REV. 116 (1968).
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1960's and the more recent DES 3 and Dalkon Shield IUD4 liti-

gation are vivid examples of mass torts arising out of the distribution of drugs and medical supplies. 5 Current litigation arising
6
from the manufacture and distribution of asbestos products
and from the government's use of "Agent Orange"7 during the
Vietnam War demonstrate the enormous amount of litigation
which may be generated by the distribution of a dangerous or
defective product.8 Mass tort litigation has also resulted from
single disasterous occurrences such as airplane crashes and
fires. Recent examples of catastrophes which generated mass
tort litigation include the Chicago air crash disaster, 9 the collapse of skywalks at the Kansas City Hyatt Regency Hotel, 10

3. See Payton v. Abbott Laboratories, 83 F.RD. 382 (D. Mass. 1979), vacated, No.
76-1514-5 (D. Mass. Oct. 3, 1983); Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d
924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). See also Note, Market Share
Liability: Answer to DES Causation Problem, 94 HARv. L. REV. 668 (1981); Note, Diesthylstibestrol:Extension of Federal Class Action Procedures to Generic Drug Litigation,
14 U.S.F.L. REV. 461 (1980); Comment, DES and a ProposedTheory of Enterprise Liabil-.
ity, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 963 (1978).
4. In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp.
887 (N.D. Cal. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Dalkon Shield], vacated and remanded, 693 F.2d
847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. A.H. Robins Co. v. Abed, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983).
5. Other examples of mass tort cases in the field of drug litigation include: "BraunwaldCutter" Aortic Heart Valve Prods. Liab. Litig., 465 F. Supp. 1295 (J.P.M.D.L. 1979); In re
Swine Flue Immunization Prods. Liab. Litig., 446 F. Supp. 244 (J.P.M.D.L 1978).
6. See, e.g., Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1982); Borel v.
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869
(1974). See generally Treiger, Relief for Asbestos Victims: A Legislative Analysis, 20
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 179, 181-82 (1983). See also Riley, Asbestos: New Approaches, Nat'l
L.J., May 7, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
7. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), modified, MDL No. 381, Memorandum and Pretrial Order No. 72 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1983),
petition for mandamus denied sub nom. In re Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., No. 833065 (2d Cir. Jan. 9, 1984), cert. denied sub nom. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co. v. Ryan,
52 U.S.L.W. 3631 (U.S. Feb. 27, 1984). See also Birnbaum & Srabel, Agent Orange Class
Certificationand Industrywide Liabilityfor DES, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 27, 1984, at 39, col. 3.
8. Other examples of toxic chemicals giving rise to multiple suits include: In re Three
Mile Island Litig., 87 F.R.D. 433 (M.D. Pa. 1980); Snyder v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics
Corp., 104 Misc. 2d 735, 429 N.Y.S. 2d 153 (1980) (Love Canal) and the Michigan polybrominated biphenyls (PBB) suits. L.A. Times, Oct. 6, 1982, at 26, col. 5 (toxic fire retardant chemical contaminated cattle feed and entered food chain). See also Weber, Mass
Tort Litigation-ThePot Boils Over, 1983 FED'N INS. COUNS. 131, 134-37.
9. See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill.,
500 F.Supp. 1044 (N.D. Ill.
1980), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878
(1981).
10. In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415 (W.D. Mo.), vacated, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 342 (1982).
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and the fires at the MGM Grand Hotel" and Beverly Hills
12
Supper Club.
Modem courts have struggled to resolve difficulties which
result from mass tort litigation. The mass tort poses complex
problems because litigation often involves numerous transactions occurring in several states.1 3 This complexity has led to the
demand for legislation to resolve the problems generated by certain mass torts.1 4 While legislation may be one solution for the
difficulties created by mass accident and mass products liability
actions, modem courts have a procedural device, the class ac-

11. In re MGM Grand Hotel Fire Litig., MDL No. 453 (D. Nev. May 5, 1981) (Transfer
Order). See also Wall St. J., Jan. 5, 1983, at A5, col. 1 (Midwest ed.). For other examples of
sudden mass accidents, see Comment, The Use of Class Actions for Mass Accident Litigation, 23 Loy. L. REv. 383, 383 nn. 2, 3 (1977).
12. Coburn v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1977).
13. See Dalkon Shield, supra note 4, 526 F.Supp. at 892, 902; Note, Mass Liability,
supra note 1, at 1797-98; Note, Punitive Damages, supra note 1, at 1273.
14. For example, after hearing portions of the litigation arising from the O'Hare DC10 crash, a case replete with choice of law and other problems, a somewhat frustrated
Judge Hubert Will testified before Congress and urged adoption of a national statute to
deal with air disasters. See In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill., 500 F.Supp. at
1049-52 (applying the law of defendants' principal place of business to determine liability
for punitive damages in wrongful death actions. Defendant McDonnell Douglas was subjected to Missouri law which allows punitive damages; defendant American Airlines' liability was decided under New York law which does not permit punitive damages in
wrongful death cases), rev'd, 644 F.2d at 632-33 (applying the substantive law of the place
of injury, Illinois, to the issue. Because Illinois does not allow punitive damages in
wrongful death suits, neither defendant was liable for punitive damages). In addition to
the choice of law problems, both the District Court and the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit dealt with the problem of prejudgment interest. In re Air Crash Disaster
Near Chicago, Ill., 480 F.Supp. 1280 (N.D. Ill. 1979), aff'd, 644 F.2d 633, 635 (7th Cir.
1981). See Kennelly, Litigation Implications of the Chicago O'Hare Airport Crash of
American Airlines Flight 191, 15 J. MAR. L. REv. 273, 297-301 (1982). Approximately 260
cases were filed in state and federal courts throughout the United States. Many of the
state cases were removed to federal court and all federal court cases were consolidated for
pre-trial hearings in Chicago. In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill., 476 F. Supp.
445 (J.P.M.D.L. 1979). The author served as liaison counsel for all plaintiffs.
The Seventh Circuit also recommended national legislation to provide a uniform
treatment of parties engaged in airline disaster litigation. In re Air Crash Disaster Near
Chicago, Ill., 644 F.2d 594, 632-33 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981). See generally
Comment, supra note 11, at 390-92; Comment, Federal Courts-ProposedAircraft Crash
Litigation Legislation,35 Mo. L. REV. 215, 217-18 (1970).

Additionally, a federal products liability act has been proposed. S. 2631, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1982) (Kasten bill). The Kasten bill follows the Model Uniform Product Liability
Act, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979), which was promulgated by the U.S. Department of Commerce. See infra note 97. See also Note, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort
Litigation:Froud v. Celotex Corp., 32 DEPAUL L REV. 457, 475-76 (1983). Moreover, legislation has been suggested to manage the multitude of asbestos-related claims. Occupational Health Hazards Compensation Act, H.R. 5735, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (Miller
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tion,15 to deal with certain problems generated by mass tort

litigation.
The class action is particularly effective in dealing with the
complex issue of the proper scope of recovery of punitive damages in mass tort litigation. 16 The primary goals of punitive
damages are to punish a defendant for his outrageous behavior
and to deter the defendant and others similarly situated from
engaging in like conduct in the future.' 7 Punitive damages
awards are particularly problematic in modern multiparty litigation because of the danger that numerous awards will bankrupt
a defendant, thereby precluding other plaintiffs from recovery.
Such awards also may penalize a defendant in a manner which
is disproportionate to his wrongdoing because of the imposition
of numerous punitive damages awards.
Accordingly, there is clearly a need to re-evaluate the doctrine
of punitive damages and adapt it to the mass tort context in
order to achieve fair and efficient adjudication of punitive damages liability in circumstances where a defendant faces liability
to numerous plaintiffs. The court system should redress wrongs
committed against contemporary society while protecting liable
parties from financial catastrophe. The class action device is one
method courts have used to provide an appropriate remedy for
8
plaintiffs and defendants.'
This article will discuss the problems associated with the
application of the punitive damages doctrine to mass tort litiga-

bill). See Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d 811, 815 (6th Cir. 1982); Whittemore, Punitive Damages, 39 Bus. LAw. 238, 241 (1983). See generally Anderson, Warshauer & Coffin, The Asbestos Health Hazards Compensation Act: A Legislative Solution to a LitigationCrisis,10 J. LEGIS. 25 (1983).
15. FED. R. CIv. P. 23. See A. MILLER, AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CLASS ACTIONS: PAST
PRESENT AND FUTURE 2-7 (1977). For an overview of state class actions, see Homburger,
State Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1971); Smith, Class
Action: State NotificationRequirementsAfter Eisen, 8 W. ST. U.L. REv. 1 (1980).
There are situations where a class action may not be appropriate for mass tort litigation, such as in the case of a mass accident resulting in individual issues of compensatory damages. Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. 69,103 (1966).
16. In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1185-91 (8th Cir.) (Heaney, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982). See Note, Punitive Damages, supra note 1, at
1275-82.
17. Dalkon Shield, supra note 4, 526 F. Supp. at 898-99.
18. E.g., In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. at 420; Dalkon Shield, supra note 4,
526 F. Supp. at 897. See Note, Class Actions for Punitive Damages, 81 MICH. L. REV.
1787, 1791-97 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, Class Actions]; Comment, supra note 11, at
383-87.
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tion. It will examine the goals punitive damages are designed to
promote, as well as the criticisms which have been directed
against such awards. Next, this article will discuss judicial
commentary regarding the appropriate control of multiple punitive damages awards in mass tort litigation. This article will
then present the goals and procedural prerequisites of federal
class actions. Following this background, this article's discussion will focus on three federal court cases where district courts
have attempted, with varying degrees of success, to use Rule 23
of the FederalRules of Civil Procedureto certify a class for punitive damages claimants. Following an analysis of the class
action approach to punitive damages, this article will conclude
by offering some suggestions for future use of this innovative
technique in mass tort cases.
BACKGROUND

The Punitive Damages Doctrine
The doctrine of punitive damages 19 developed as part of the
English common law 20 and it gained substantial acceptance in

the United States by the middle of the nineteenth century. 21 Today, the doctrine is recognized by nearly all fifty states. 22 The

19. The term "punitive damages" is used interchangeably with exemplary damages.
Historically, punitive damages have also been referred to as "indicative," "punititory,"

and "presumptive" damages. See Riley, Punitive Damages: The Doctrine of Just Enrichment, 27 DRAKE L. REV. 195, 199 (1977).
20. The landmark English case which first articulated the theory of punitive damages

is Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. 205, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763). For a thorough discussion
of the origin of the punitive damages doctrine, see Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort
Cases, 44 HARv. L. REV. 1173 (1931).
21. See Owen, Punitive Damages in Product Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV.
1257, 1263 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Owen I].
22. Only five jurisdictions do not recognize punitive damages. See Ganapolsky v.
Park Gardens Dev. Corp., 439 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1971) (applying Puerto Rican law); Bautte
v. Hargrove, 277 So. 2d 757 (La. App. 1973); City of Lowell v. Massachusetts Bonding &
Ins. Co., 313 Mass. 257, 269-70, 47 N.E.2d 265, 272 (1943); Miller v. Kingsley, 194 Neb. 123,
230 N.W.2d 186 (1968). Connecticut, Michigan and New Hampshire limit the award of
punitive damages to compensation for actual suffering. See LeBlanc v. Spector, 378 F.
Supp. 301 (D. Conn. 1973) (limited to litigation expenses); Wise v. Daniel, 221 Mich. 229,
190 N.W. 746 (1922) (limited to compensation for injured feelings); Bixley v. Dunlap, 56
N.H. 456 (1876) (limited to compensation for injured feelings). See also Owen, Problems in
Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturersof Defective Products, 49 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 8 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Owen II].
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doctrine of punitive damages 23 serves important functions in our
society. 24 Both the historic development and the continued viability of this remedy demonstrate that public policy demands fair
25
retribution for serious wrongdoing.
Punitive damages have at least two major goals. First, they
26
are designed to punish the defendant for his outrageous conduct.
Second, they are intended to deter the defendant, and others similarly situated, from engaging in like conduct in the future.27 The punishment aspect of the punitive damages doctrine
may be characterized as an expression to the defendant that his
conduct is so malicious, oppressive or otherwise outrageous that

23. Despite its current wide acceptance, some controversy exists over its effectiveness
and desirability. See generally Ghiardi, Should Punitive Damages Be Abolished? A
Statement for the Affirmative, 1956 ABA PROC. 282 (section of insurance, negligence and
compensation law); Long, Punitive Damages: An Unsettled Doctrine, 25 DRAKE L. REV.
870 (1976); Note, The Imposition of Punishment By Civil Courts: A Reappraisalof Punitive Damages, 41 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1158 (1966). See also Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis.
2d 260, 331, 294 N.W.2d 437, 472 (1980) (Coffey, J., dissenting); C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF
DAMAGES § 77 (1935).
24. See generally Morris, supra note 20, at 1179; Owen I, supra note 21, at 1262-68;
Riley, supra note 19, at 198-201. Despite criticism, punitive damages are "an established
part of our legal system, and there is no indication of any present desire or tendency to
abandon them." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTS § 2, at 11 (4th ed. 1971).
25. Robinson & Kane, Punitive Damages in Product Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L.
REV. 1257, 1262-64 (1976). E.g., Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689,
716, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 417 (1967) (justifying a punitive damages award of $250,000 for the
fraudulent marketing of the dangerous drug MER/29 on the common law theory of retribution); Luther v. Snow, 157 Wis. 234, 147 N.W.2d 18 (1914) ("[Tihe law giving-exemplary
damages is an outgrowth of the English love of liberty regulated by law.").
From the ancient Code of Hammurabi in 2000 B.C. to the punitive damages awards in
modern products liability suits, punitive damages continue to play an integral part of
remedial civil law. K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 2.9, at 43-44 (1980). Cf. Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages,56 S. CALL. REV. 1, 12-19, 33 (1982)
(suggesting a limited application of punitive damages).
26. E.g., Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 IM. 2d 172, 186, 384 N.E.2d 353, 359 (1978). See
REDDEN, supra note 25, § 2.1, at 23-24; Mallor & Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a
PrincipledApproach, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 648 (1980).
27. E.g., Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1981). See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF REMEDIES § 3.9, at 205 (1973). For a complete discussion of the goals
of punishment and deterrence, see Schwartz, Deterrenceand Punishment in the Common

Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 133 (1982). Although there are several other
purposes which punitive damages may serve, punishment and deterrence are the primary
rationales. See Long, supra note 23, at 876; Owen I, supra note 21, at 1277. Professor
Owen notes two less prominent functions of punitive damages: to induce private persons
to enforce the laws by bringing wrongdoers to justice and to compensate victims whose
actual losses exceed those for which the law allows recovery. Id. at 1278. See W. PROSSER,
supranote 24, § 2.1, at 11. Cf. Note, Punitive Damages, supranote 1, at 1277-78 (punitive
damages are an incentive to plaintiffs to bring suit).
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it will not be tolerated by the rest of society. 28 Theoretically, the
infliction of punishment for past acts tends to control and deter
future misconduct. 29 Presumably, after being assessed punitive
damages as a result of egregious behavior, the defendant and
others will refrain from such conduct in the future so as to avoid
30
the consequences.
Punitive damages awards are unique in the area of civil law.
In contrast to compensatory damages which are designed to
make the plaintiff whole, 3 1 punitive damages are directed at the
conduct of the defendant. 32 Although punitive damages are
awarded to an individual plaintiff, they are extracted for the
benefit of society. 33 They are assessed over and above compensatory damages when the defendant's wrongful conduct rises

28.

The United States Supreme Court recognized the element of punishment in a pun-

itive damages award in Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1851):
It is a well-established principal of the common law, that... a jury may inflict
what are called exemplary, punitive or vindictive damages upon a defendant,
having in view the enormity of his offence [sic] rather than the measure of
compensation to the plaintiffs.... By common as well as statute law, men are
often punished for aggravated misconduct or lawless acts, by means of civil
action and the damages inflicted, by way of penalty or punishment, given to
the party injured.
Id. at 371.
29. Owen I, supra note 21, at 1279. See generally, Ellis, supra note 25, at 4-8 (punishment and the consequent payment of a cost derived from the notion of "desert").
30. One commentator recognized that "[wihile the practical effectiveness of punishment in deterring misbehavior is a source of constant debate, most commentators agree
that punishment does achieve a measure of deterrence in many cases." Owen I, supra
note 21, at 1283. See Andenais, The GeneralPreventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA.
L. REV. 949, 961 (1966); Mallor & Roberts, supra note 26, at 648. For a more detailed
discussion of the deterrent aspect of punitive damages, see Morris, supranote 20, at 117577; Owen I, supranote 21, at 1282-87. See also Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691
F.2d 811, 816 (6th Cir. 1982); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 278, 294 N.W.2d
437, 451-52 (1980) (Coffey, J., dissenting).
31. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908, comment (b) (1979). Punitive damages
are not awarded for mere inadvertence, mistake, or errors of judgment which constitute
ordinary negligence. Id.
32. See Riley, supra note 19, at 225. Typical types of actions where punitive damages
are awarded are fraud, assault and battery, seduction, criminal conversion, alienation of
affections, malicious prosecution, false arrest and imprisonment, abuse of process, libel,
slander, trespass, nuisance, gross negligence and recklessness. Id. at 225-32. See also
W. PROSSER, supra note 24, § 2, at 10-11. While punitive damages have been traditionally
assessed in tort actions, some jurisdictions have imposed punitive damages in contract
actions involving oppressive or malicious conduct. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 26, at
658-63. See REDDEN, supra note 25, § 2.5, at 41-42.
33. E.g., Dalkon Shield, supra note 4, 526 F.Supp. at 899; Wangen, 97 Wis. 2d at 270,
294 N.W.2d at 442. See Morris, supra note 20, at 1177 n. 7.
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above the level of mere negligence. 34 As a general rule, intentional, illegal, malicious, wanton, reckless, or grossly negligent
35
conduct will justify an award of punitive damages.
It is generally accepted that it is not possible to establish a
quantitative formula for determining the proper amount of punitive damages which can be applied in all cases. 36 However, the
same may be said of many other forms of damages. Moreover,
there are some general criteria which may assist a jury in determining an appropriate punitive damages award. Currently, a
number of identifiable factors are considered relevant to a jury's
determination. A jury may consider the nature of the act itself,
the circumstances surrounding the commission of the act, 37 the
extent of harm to the plaintiff,38 and the wealth of the defendant.39 Also, significant in certain cases is the existence of multiple claims by other persons based on the same wrongful conduct. 40
34. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS (1979) provides in parts:
(1) Punitive damages are damages, other than compensatory or nominal
damages, awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous

conduct and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the
future.
(2) Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because
of defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of
others.

Id. § 908.
35. REDDEN, supra note 25, § 2.6, at 42. See Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, I.P.I.
§ 35.01 (1961). In products liability suits, Professor Owen suggests that punitive damages
should be assessed against a defendant manufacturer for "conduct that reflects a flagrant indifference to the public safety." Owen I, supra note 21, at 1367. See also Moore v.
Remington Arms Co., 100 Ill. App. 3d 1102, 1115, 427 N.E.2d 608,617 (1981).
36. See Mallor & Roberts, supranote 26, at 664. The authors point out that a quantitative formula would be undesirable. First, the deterrent impact of punitive damages would
be minimized if a person contemplating wrongful conduct could gauge his or her maximum liability in advance. Second, any uniformity in a sanction that strikes at wealth
would pose the danger of being excessive for poor defendants and inadequate for rich
ones. Id. at 666. See also Wangen, 97 Wis. 2d at 302-03, 294 N.W.2d at 459 (stating that
"[plunitive damages must be decided on a case-by-case basis").
37. These include the motives of the wrongdoers, the relations between the parties,
and the provocation or want of provocation for the act. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 908, comment (e) (1979).
38. Id. However, it is not essential to the award of punitive damages that the plaintiff
has suffered physical or pecuniary harm. Id. § 908, comment (c).
39. See id. § 908, comment (e). It is obvious that the defendant's wealth would be an
important consideration in arriving at an amount which would effectively punish and
deter. While an amount of $50,000 would have a significant impact on a company worth
$500,000, it would hardly have any effect on a multi-billion dollar corporation. See also
Owen II, supranote 22, at 19-20.
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908, comment (e) (1979).
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Despite these criteria, a primary criticism of the punitive damages doctrine focuses on the difficulties in determining an appro41
priate amount of damages to be assessed in a particular case.
Critics contend that there is a need for more precise guidelines
and more effective controls on the extent of punishment juries
42
should be allowed to impose in the form of punitive damages.
Critics maintain that the lack of concrete guidelines and controls
give jurors too much discretion, thereby allowing them to award
excessive amounts of punitive damages based on their passions
and prejudices, instead of basing such awards on specific standards which would insure just results. 43 Some critics argue that
even if there were more concrete guidelines governing the determination of punitive damages awards, juries should not decide
the amounts of such awards because jurors are inexperienced
44
and unqualified to mete out the proper punishment.
The amount of punitive damages awards has increased in
recent times, especially in products liability suits. 45 Awards in
excess of several million dollars have been upheld in many
instances. 46 Because of the explosion of claims in the area of
mass tort litigation, which frequently involve claims for punitive

41. See Owen I, supra note 21, at 1314-15; Riley, supra note 19, at 201, 216. See generally Carsey, The Case Against PunitiveDamages, 11 FORUM 57 (1975); Sales, The Emergence of Punitive Damages in Product Liability Actions: A Further Assault on the Citadel, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 351 (1983). See also supra note 23. Much of the criticism of punitive damages has been directed at large awards in products liability suits. See Owen II,
supra note 22, at 6-7, 7 n.33.
42. E.g., Owen I, supra note 21, at 1315-19, 1361-71 (suggesting considerations for
measuring punitive damages in products liability cases); Riley, supra note 19, at 249-51
(advocating that courts should redefine the terms for defendant's conduct and use procedural devices to limit and assess punitive damages). See also Morris, Punitive Damages
in PersonalInjury Cases, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 216, 227 (1960); Owen, Civil Punishment and
the Public Good, 56 S. CAL. REV. 103,117-21 (1982); Owen II, supra note 22, at 50-59.
Some commentators recommend that the judge, rather than the jury should determine
the amount of a punitive damages award. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 26, at 664. The
court would consider the following factors: severity of threatened harm, degree of reprehensibility of defendant's conduct, profitability of the conduct, financial position of the
defendant, amount of compensatory damages assessed, costs of litigation, potential criminal sanctions and other civil actions against the defendant based on the same conduct.
Id. at 667-69.
43. See Ellis, supra note 25, at 42-43, 53; Mallor & Roberts, supra note 26, at 646.
44. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 26, at 663-64. See also Morris, supra note 20, at 1179;
Owen I, supra note 21, at 1320-21.
45. See Owen II, supranote 22, at 6; Putz & Astiz, supra note 1, at 5.
46. E.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 52 U.S.LW. 4043 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1984), rev'g,
563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977) (state court award of $10 million in punitive damages reinstated); Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., 655 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1981) (reinstatement of $5
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damages, the conflict between the goals of punitive damages and
the criticism regarding the lack of necessary guidelines to determine the appropriate amounts of awards has increased significance and a greater need for resolution.
The Problem of PunitiveDamages
in the Mass Tort Context
Although the doctrine of punitive damages presents problems
and has generated controversy even in single party litigation,
these problems are exacerbated and the controversy intensified
when the doctrine is viewed in the mass tort context. 47 The lack
of standards and controls over punitive damages awards by juries becomes especially troublesome in the typical mass tort situation where a defendant faces potential liability to hundreds or
even thousands of plaintiffs across the country. 48 Serious problems are created not only for defendants, but also for plaintiffs.
There are several identifiable problems associated with awards
of punitive damages in mass tort cases. One difficulty is the
danger that punitive damages in the mass tort context will have
a devastating financial impact on the defendant. The most
obvious result of multiple claims for punitive damages is the
possibility of multiple awards of punitive damages. 49 It is clear
that all defendants, even large corporations, have finite assets
from which punitive damages awards can be satisfied.5 0 The
widely publicized Johns Manville Corporation's filing of a chapter 11 bankruptcy in response to the bringing of claims against it

million punitive damages verdict); Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757,
174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981) (upholding $3.5 million punitive damages award that the trial
court remitted from the $125 million punitive damages jury verdict). See Belli, Punitive
Damages, Their History, Their Use and Their Worth in Present Day Society, 49 UMKC
L. REV. 1979, 1797 n.1 (1980); Owen II, supra note 22, at 2-7
47. See supra note 1. See also W. PROSSER, supra note 24, § 2, at 13. Cf. Owen II, supra
note 22, at 13-16, 45-46 (explaining that the purpose and measurement of punitive damages in traditional contexts does not extend to current products liability actions against
major manufacturing corporations).
48. E.g., Dalkon Shield, supra note 4,526 F.Supp. at 892-93, 899-900. See Putz & Astiz,
supra note 1, at 12-14.
49. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 (2d Cir. 1967). See also
Owen I, supra note 21, at 1322-25; Note, Class Actions, supra note 18, at 1791-94.
50. Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294-96, 294 N.W.2d 437, 455-56 (1980)
(Coffey, J., dissenting). See Owen II, supra note 22, at 13-14. Additionally, corporate
assets vary during the course of litigation. Id. at 14.
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which relate to injuries caused by exposure to asbestos is a vivid
example of such a problem.51 It is apparent that hundreds or
thousands of substantial punitive damages awards can have
52
severe financial consequences for even the wealthiest defendant.
Defendants may be unable to satisfy these awards and may be
53
forced into bankruptcy in the process.
Furthermore, multiple punitive damages awards may not advance the ultimate objectives which justify the imposition of
punitive damages. 54 In accordance with the goals of punitive
damages, awards should total an amount in relation to the
wealth of the defendant that will effectively punish the defendant for his wrongdoing and deter him and others from engaging in similar conduct in the future. 55 In the context of mass tort
litigation, depending on the amount of individual awards, one or
a few punitive damages awards may effectively punish and

51. In re Johns-Manville Corp., Nos. 82B 11656-676 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 26,
1982). See Lewin, The Legal Issues in Manville's Move, N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1982, at D4,
col. 1. See also Note, The Manville Bankruptcy: Treating Mass Tort Claims in Chapter 11
Proceedings, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1121 (1983). Whether the Manville allegations of bankruptcy are accurate is uncertain. Id. at 1122. See W. St. J., Jan. 27, 1983, at 29, col. 4
(noting that Manville seeks to consolidate all present and future claims against it and
limit its liability through bankruptcy proceedings); W. St. J., Aug. 27, 1982, at 8, col. 1
(Manville considered the healthiest grant corporation to file for bankruptcy with a net
worth over $1.1 billion as of June 20, 1982). See also Does Manville Belong in Chapter 11,
CAL. LAW., May 1983, at 9.
52. See Roginsky, 378 F.2d at 838-39. Judge Friendly's prediction of economic destruction for defendant Richardson-Merrill, Inc. in the MER/29 litigation was not fulfilled. See
Owen I, supra note 21, at 1324-25. See also Wangen, 97 Wis. 2d at 297-98, 294 N.W.2d at
457 (rejecting defendant's argument that severe economic consequences precluded an
award of punitive damages because courts could effectively control the amount of punitive damages).
53. See Roginsky, 378 F.2d at 839; Coburn v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43, 45 (E.D. Ky.
1977). In Dalkon Shield, supra note 4, 526 F.Supp. at 897, the court's decision was influenced by the fact that, in light of the substantial number of claims against the defendant,
the threat of constructive bankruptcy pervaded the matter. See, Note, Class Actions,
supranote 18, at 1792-93.
Some might say that if the defendant is guilty of conduct which is culpable enough to
warrant an award of punitive damages, then it deserves to be financially devastated or
even forced into bankruptcy. But see Wangen, 97 Wis. 2d. at 294, 294 N.W.2d at 455;
Owen II, supra note 22, at 6-7.
54. Note, Punitive Damages,supra note 1, at 1280-82.
55. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 381, Memorandum and Pretrial
Order No. 72, at 27-28 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1983), petition for mandamus denied sub nom.
In re Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., No. 83-3065 (2d Cir. Jan. 9, 1984), cert. denied sub
nom. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co. v. Ryan, 52 U.S.LW. 3631 (U.S. Feb. 27, 1984);
Dalkon Shield, supra note 4, 526 F. Supp. at 899; Wangen, 97 Wis. 2d at 292-93, 294
N.W.2d at 454.
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deter.56 Substantial multiple awards, therefore, may result in
punishing a defendant in a manner which is disproportionate to
his wrongdoing. 57 The purposes of punitive damages are not
served by awarding an amount which, in light of the defendant's
net wealth and the gravity of a particular act, exceeds a level
necessary to properly punish and deter.
Some even argue that multiple punitive damages awards may
violate a defendant's constitutional rights. 58 In the realm of
criminal law, the double jeopardy prohibition on multiple prosecutions of a defendant for the same crime protects the defendant
from multiple punishments. 59 Although restricted to the civil
law context, the doctrine of punitive damages serves similar
objectives as criminal punishment. Both are designed to punish
a defendant for wrongful conduct and to deter him and others
like him from engaging in such conduct in the future. 60 The
double jeopardy analogy to multiple punitive damages awards
has been rejected by courts presented with this issue, 61 nevertheless this argument highlights the potential inequities that can

56. Roginsky, 378 F.2d at 838-39; Dalkon Shield, supra note 4,526 F. Supp. at 899.
57. See Rosener v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 110 Cal. App. 3d 740, 751-52, 168 Cal. Rptr.
237, 243-44 (1980); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORms § 908, comment (e) (1979). See also, K.
REDDEN, supra note 25, § 47(c)(1), at 121.
58. See In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1188-91 (8th Cir.) (Heaney, J.,
dissenting) (addressing defendants' seventh amendment and due process claims), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982); Dalkon Shield, supra note 4, 526 F. Supp. at 899-900. See also
K. REDDEN, supra note 25, § 7.2, at 602-10 (suggesting that punitive damages violate the
fourth, fifth and sixth amendments); Putz & Astiz, supra note 1, at 29-31; Riley, supra
note 19, at 243-45.
59. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment provides in pertinent part: [Nior
shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb:.. . For a complete explanation of the double jeopardy argument, see K. REDDEN,
supra note 25, at § 4.9, § 7.2(A)(2)(b). See also Putz & Astiz, supra note 1, at 17-18; Note,
Mass Liability, supra note 1, at 1805-06.
60. See Mallor & Roberts, supra note 26, at 647-49; Note, supra note 23, at 1180-81. The
quasi-criminal nature of punitive damages has led some critics to suggest that punitive
damages should not be awarded in the absence of the appropriate procedural safeguards
which apply in criminal cases. See K. REDDEN, supra note 25, § 4.7(c)(1), § 7.2(A)(6);
Mallor & Roberts, supra note 26, at 644-45; Riley, supra note 19, at 243-45; Comment,
Criminal Safeguards and the Punitive Damages Defendant, 34 U. CHI. L REv. 408, 41318 (1967). Such an argument was expressly rejected in Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,
251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 713, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 417-18 (1967). See Note, supra note 14, at
468-69.
61. E.g., Dalkon Shield, supra note 4, 526 F. Supp. at 899; Lemer v. Boise Cascade,
Inc., 107 Cal. App. 3d 1, 7, 165 Cal. Rptr. 555, 559 (1980); Toole, 251 Cal. App. 2d at 718, 60
Cal. Rptr. at 418. One commentator noted that the double jeopardy argument has been
rejected by every court that has heard it because double jeopardy only applies to two
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result from multiple punitive damages awards. Some courts have
viewed any questions regarding the constitutionality of punitive
damages awards as involving due process considerations because of the argument that multiple awards violate notions of
fundamental fairness. 62 However, no assertions that multiple
punitive damages awards are unconstitutional have been sustained by the courts.
As a result of potential inequities to a defendant in multiparty
litigation involving punitive damages claims, some have argued
that punitive damages should not be assessed, contending that
compensatory damages in such a situation are sufficient to punish the defendant for his conduct and deter the defendant and
others from future misconduct. 63 However, allowing the defendant to escape liability for punitive damages would vitiate the
goals of punitive damages. 6 4 If a defendant corporation has
injured a large number of people, then it should be punished to
deter itself and others from future wrongdoing. 65 Compensatory
damages, alone, would be insufficient to accomplish these objectives even in the event of multiple judgments. 66 Moreover, not-

criminal sanctions by the sovereign, not to civil proceedings. Note, Mass Liability, supra
note 1, at 1805.
62. See, e.g., In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d at 1188 (Heaney, J., dissenting);
Roginsky, 378 F.2d at 840; In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 381, Memorandum and Pretrial Order No. 72, at 28; Dalkon Shield, supra note 4, 526 F. Supp. at
899-900. See also K. Redden, supra note 25, § 7.2(B), at 610-11; Putz & Astiz, supra note 1,
at 29-31. It has been suggested that overlapping awards not only may violate a sense of
fundamental fairness, but constitutional due process may encompass principles of res
judicata and the notion that litigation must come to an end. In re Federal Skywalk

Cases, 680 F.2d at 1188; Dalkon Shield, supra note 4,526 F. Supp. at 899.
63. E.g., Roginsky, 378 F.2d at 841.
64.

J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHNER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW AND PRACTICE § 6.10, at 40-41

(1981); Owen II, supra note 22, at 59. In Wangen, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin succinctly concluded: "Although the risk that manufacturers may be subjected to excessive
punitive damages is real, the need for punitive damages as a tool for punishment and
deterrence is also real." 97 Wis. 2d at 309, 294 N.W.2d at 461.
65. Froud v. Celotex Corp., 107 Ill. App. 3d 654, 658, 437 N.E.2d 910, 913 (1982), rev'd,
98 Ill.
2d 324, 456 N.E.2d 1316 (1983). In Froud,the Illinois Appellate Court aptly stated:
[W]e do not believe that defendants should be relieved of liability for punitive
damages merely because, through outrageous misconduct, they have managed
to seriously injure a large number of persons. Such a rule would encourage
wrongdoers to continue their misconduct because, if they kept it up long enough
to injure a large number of people, they could escape all liability for punitive
damages.
Id. See Note, supranote 14, at 463-464.
66. E.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 812, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348,
384 (1981). The California Appellate Court condemned defendant Ford's "cost-benefit
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withstanding the Manville situation, the threat of bankrupting
a
67
corporation has proven to be more theoretical than real.

Ideally, punitive damages in the mass tort context should
result in a total award which in relation to the defendant's
wealth effectively punishes and deters the defendant. Therefore,
courts need to accurately assess the potential harm to the defendant in light of the goals of punitive damages. The purpose is to
"sting, not kill, a defendant." 68 In some circumstances, substantial individual punitive damages awards in mass tort litigation
may prevent the achievement of such a result. Class actions,
which would permit unitary consideration of such damages may
be the most viable method of preventing defendants from being
punished in a manner which is disproportionate to their wrongdoing, while insuring that defendants are appropriately punished and deterred from engaging in similar conduct in the
future.
The defendant, however, is not the only party that may be
adversely affected by the imposition of multiple punitive damages awards in the mass tort context. There are potential problems for plaintiffs who seek recovery from a defendant who faces
multiple punitive damages liability.6 9 First, there is the danger
that the defendant will be incapable of satisfying all punitive
damages awards which are assessed. 70 In addition, there is the
possibility that at some point in time a determination will be
made that there should be a limit on the amount of punitive
damages that may be assessed against a defendant for the same

analysis balancing human lives and limbs against corporate profits," id., and labeled
Ford's conduct as "reprehensible in the extreme." Id. at 819, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 388. See
Morris, supra note 20, at 1185-87; Owen I, supra note 21, at 1323-24; Note, Class Actions,
supra note 18, at 1794 n.46. See also Wangen, 97 Wis. 2d at 288, 294 N.W.2d at 451.
67. Owen I, supra note 21, at 1323-24. Of the 1500 claims that were filed against
Richardson-Merrell, Inc. in the MER/29 litigation, only eleven were tried to a jury verdict. Seven cases were decided for the plaintiff, and in only three of these were punitive
damages awarded, one of which was reversed on appeal. Id. at 1324. See Rheingold,
supra note 2, at 132-34; Note, supranote 14, at 469.
68. Dalkon Shield, supra note 4, 526 F. Supp. at 899. Accord Maxey v. Freightliner,
450 F. Supp. 955, 961 (N.D. Tex. 1978), aff'd., 623 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1980), modified, 665
F.2d 1367 (5th Cir. 1982). In Wangen, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin observed that an
appropriate award "will serve the punishment and deterrent objectives of punitive damages, but.. .will not inflict a penalty on a defendant disproportionate to the defendant's
wrong and contrary to public interest." 97 Wis. 2d at 299, 294 N.W.2d at 457.
69. See Roginsky, 378 F.2d at 839-41; Dalkon Shield, supra note 4, 526 F. Supp. at 898;
Note, Class Actions, supranote 18, at 1787-90.
70. See In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. at 424.
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conduct. 71 In such a case, a court may determine that a defendant has been "punished enough" by awards in previous cases.
72
Thus, it may deny or limit a plaintiff s punitive damages claim.
In either circumstance, the result will essentially be the same
for the plaintiffs. The first plaintiffs that are able to bring their
claims to judgment will receive all the punitive damages recovery, while later plaintiffs will receive nothing. This "race-to-thecourthouse syndrome" has been universally criticized. 73 It is

unfair to the late-filing plaintiffs. It may be even more unfair to
plaintiffs who have filed early, but due to fortuitous circumstances such as docket congestion in their jurisdiction, may be
unable to get to trial. It may also create problems for attorneys
who represent more than one plaintiff in mass tort litigation.
They may be placed in the difficult position of deciding which
claim to pursue to judgment first,74 knowing that subsequent

punitive damages claims in cases may be limited or even barred
by the court, the jury, or the bankruptcy of the defendant. Therefore, from the plaintiffs' standpoint as well, class actions which
would permit unitary consideraton of plaintiffs' punitive damages claims may be the most desirable resolution of such claims

71. At the present time, there is no universally accepted answer to the question of
whether sucessive punitive damages awards for the same conduct are permissible. In
State ex rel. Young v. Crookham, 290 Or. 61, 618 P.2d 1268 (1980), the Oregon Supreme
Court rejected such a "one bite" or "first comer" rule of punitive damages. The plaintiffs
were seventy-five persons who filed claims against Crater Lake Lodge for severe gastrointestinal injuries suffered as a result of exposure to a certain bacteria. The circuit judge
ordered that plaintiffs' punitive damages claims were precluded because such damages
were awarded in a previous case. Id. at 63, 618 P.2d at 1269-70. The Oregon Supreme
Court held that although it recognized the potentially onerous effect of multiple punitive
damages awards on the defendant, it rejected the "one bite/first comer" solution as inappropriate. Id. at 72, 618 P.2d at 1274. It noted that "[olther alternatives remain available
to mitigate the potential effect of multiple punitive damages; class actions, in appropriate
cases, provide for unitary consideration of such damages." Id. See also deHaas v. Empire
Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1977); Globus v. Law Research Serv., 418 F.2d
1276 (2d Cir. 1969). But see In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. at 424-25 (indicating
some uncertainty as to whether multiple punitive damages awards are permissible under
Missouri law). However, some courts and commentators have suggested to the contrary.
See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
72. See Dalkon Shield, supra note 4, 526 F. Supp. at 900 (where the court noted that its
decision was influenced by this possibility).
73. See deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1971); Globus v.
Law Research Serv., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969); Roginsky, 378 F.2d at 839; State ex rel.
Young, 290 Or. at 67, 618 P.2d at 1271-72. See also Annot, 11 A.LR.4th 1261 (1982).
74. The district court mentioned that this was "one final consideration that indirectly
bears on [its] decision." In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. at 425.
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because it would prevent the race-to-the-courthouse syndrome,
thereby insuring that all plaintiffs would receive a share of the
punitive damages assessed against a defendant for his outrageous conduct.
The mass tort punitive damages problem is exacerbated by the
lack of uniformity regarding whether punitive damages are covered by the defendant's liability insurance.7 5 This question has
been resolved in three different ways. Some states have held that
ordinary liability insurance does cover punitive damages. 76 Other
states, including Illinois, have determined that permitting such
coverage would violate public policy. 77 This view is based on the
principle that no one should be permitted to profit from his own
wrongdoing. The theory is that if a person is able to insure himself against punishment, he gains freedom to engage in misconduct.78 Finally, other courts have construed liability policy lan-

75. For a more thorough consideration of the issue of the insurability of punitive
damages, see Conley & Bishop, Punitive Damages and the GeneralLiability Insurance
Policy, 25 FED'N INS. CoUNs. 309 (1975); Haskell, Punitive Damages: The Public Policy
and the Insurance Policy, 58 IL. B.J. 780 (1970); Long, Should Punitive Damages Be
Insured?, 44 J. OF RISK AND INS. 1 (1977). See also K. REDDEN, supra note 25, at §§ 9.1, 9.6.

76. Twelve states have held that insurance coverage of punitive damages does not
contravene public policy: Harris v. County of Racine, 512 F. Supp. 1273 (E.D. Wis. 1981);
Fagat v. Ciravola, 445 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. La. 1978); Price v. Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co., 108 Ariz. 485,502 P.2d 522 (1972); Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 246 Ark.
849, 410 S.W.2d 582 (1969); Abbi Uriguen Oldsmobile Buick Inc. v. United States Fire Ins.
Co., 95 Idaho 501, 511 P.2d 783 (1973); Continental Ins. Co. v. Hancock, 507 S.W.2d 146
(Ky. 1973); First Nat'l Bank of St. Mary's v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., 283 Md. 228, 389
A.2d 359 (1978); Walff v. General Casualty Ins. Co., 68 N.M. 292, 361 P.2d 330 (1961);
Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199, 567 P.2d 1013 (1977); Lazenby v. Universal
Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964); Dairyland County Mut. Ins.
Co., v. Wallgren, 477 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972); State v. Glen Falls Ins. Co., 137 Vt.
313,404 A.2d 101 (1979). See Note, supranote 14, at 467 n.67.
77. Beaver v. Country Mutual Ins. Co., 95 Ill. App. 2d 1122, 420 N.E.2d 1058 (1981).
Nine other states which have decided the issue have found that public policy bars the
insurability of punitive damages. Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d
432 (5th Cir. 1962); American Ins. Co. v. Saulnier, 242 F. Supp. 257 (D. Conn. 1965); Ford
Motor Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 116 Cal. App. 3d 31, 172 Cal. Rptr. 59 (1981); Miller v. United
States Fidelity & Casualty Co., 291 Mass. 415, 197 N.E. 75 (1935); Crull v. Gleb, 382
S.W.2d 17 (Mo. App. 1964); Variety Farms, Inc. v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 172 N.J.
Super. 10, 410 A.2d 696 (1980); Padawan v. Clemente, 43 App. Div. 2d 729, 350 N.Y.S.2d
694 (1973); Dayton Hudson Corp. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 621 P.2d 1155 (Okla.
1980); Esmond v. Liscio, 209 Pa. Super. 200,224 A.2d 793 (1966). See Annot, 16 A.LR4th
11 (1982).
78. The leading case which explains the rationale for prohibiting punitive damages
on public policy grounds is Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th
Cir. 1962). There, the court recognized the similarity between punitive damages and criminal sanctions and found that public policy prohibits insuring against civil punishment
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guage so that it does not encompass punitive damages. 79
Regardless of the approach taken by a particular jurisdiction,
there exists the possibility that a defendant's punitive damages
liability will not be covered by insurance.80 Where no coverage is
permitted, the defendant will have to shoulder the burden of the
total amount of punitive damages liability. Even where insurance coverage is allowed, it may be inadequate to cover the total
amount of damages which may be assessed in a mass tort
8
situation. '
Punitive damages, therefore, cause problems to both defendants
and plaintiffs in the mass tort context. Multiple awards may bankrupt a defendant and fail to promote the punishment and deterrent
goals of punitive damages. If a limited amount of punitive damages may be awarded against a defendant, later-suing plaintiffs
will receive reduced or no punitive damages. Furthermore, lack of
insurance coverage for punitive damages may jeopardize a defendant's interest in full payment without financial destruction, and
plaintiffs' interest in receipt of the award. Accordingly, both the
amounts of punitive damages awards and the manner of distribution of such awards requires careful consideration by the courts in
mass tort cases.
JudicialCommentary on PunitiveDamages
in Mass Tort Litigation
Until recently, the problem of punitive damages in the mass tort
context received little judicial commentary. One of the first instances where this issue was given meaningful discussion was in
the opinion written by Judge Henry Friendly of the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell,

for the same reasons one cannot insure against the imposition of a criminal fine. Id. at
441-42.
79. Bradley v. Berkshire Mut. Ins. Co., 440 A.2d 359, 361 (Me. 1982); Casperson v.
Webber, 298 Minn. 93, 213 N.W.2d 327 (1973); Brown v. Western Casualty & Surety Co.,
484 P.2d 1252 (Colo. App. 1971); Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. App. 1964).
80. J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHNER, supra note 64, § 7.29; Owen I, supra note 21, at 1310.
Cf. Ellis, supra note 25, at 71.
81. The litigation arising out of injuries alledgedly caused by asbestos products provides a dramatic example of the inadequacies of ordinary liability insurance coverage in
the context of a mass tort. See generally Mansfield, Asbestos: The Cases and The Insurance Problem, 15 FORUM 860 (1980); Oshinsky, Insurance Coverage For Asbestos Tort
Liability Litigation,5 J. PROD. LAsB. 69 (1982). See also In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 93
F.R.D. at 419 (where the court noted that the defendants' total liabiltiy coverage was 333
million dollars and the pending claims already totaled in excess of one billion dollars in
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Inc. 82 Roginsky was one of the cases which arose out of injuries
caused by the distribution of the drug MER/29. 83 It was the first
case to reach trial of some seventy-five cases arising out of the use
of the drug which were then pending in the Southern District of
New York. 84 There were also hundreds of MER/29 cases pending
in other courts nationwide.8 5 The trial court in Roginsky had
awarded $17,500 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages to the plaintiffs. 86 On appeal, the defendant argued
that because of the multiplicity of claims, there should be some
limitation on the total amount of punitive damages which could be
87
awarded in all the MER/29 cases.
The Second Circuit did not reach the issue of multiple punitive
damages awards because it reversed the lower court's decision
on the basis that there was insufficient evidence to warrant
submission of the damages issue to the jury.88 Judge Friendly,
writing for the Second Circuit, nonetheless discussed the staggering legal difficulties engendered by multiple punitive damages claims
based on the defendant's same wrongful conduct.89 Judge Friendly

compensatory damages and 500 million dollars in punitive damages).
82. 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967).
83. MER/29 was a drug, developed by the defendant Richardson-Merrell, Inc. in the
late 1950's, which was designed to lower blood cholesteral levels. At that time most physicians believed that a high level of cholesterol was a significant precursor of atherosclerosis. Id. at 835. For an explanation of the medical background of MER/29, see Rheingold, supra note 2, at 116-20.
84. 378 F.2d at 835. In early 1962, use of MER/29 was connected to the development
of cataracts and the drug was removed from the market. Id. at 836. However, the defendant had falsified the testing of MER/29 which eventually caused severe eye injuries,
hair loss and skin disorders. Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689,
695-701, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 404-08 (1967). For a complete discussion of the national litigation planned by plaintiffs' attorneys, see Rheingold, supra note 2, at 121-30.
85. 378 F.2d at 834. See Owen I, supranote 21, at 1323-25.
86. 378 F.2d at 834.
87. Id. at 835. In Roginsky, the Court specifically noted that there were three trial
courts that had already rendered large judgments for the plaintiffs in MER/29 cases. Id.
at 834 n.3. In Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., No. 524 722 (Super. Ct. Cal.), the jury
awarded $175,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive damages. The latter was later reduced to $250,000 in light of other pending cases. Toole, 251 Cal. App. 2d
at 693-94, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 403. In Ostopowitz v. Wm. S. Merrell Co. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 4,
1967), the jury awarded $350,000 in compensatory damages and $850,000 in punitive
damages (the latter award was later reduced to $100,000). In Golden v. RichardsonMerrell, Inc., Civ. No. 5992 (W.D. Wash. April 7, 1966), a verdict of $150,000 was rendered
for the plaintiff. See K. REDDEN, supra note 25, § 4.7(B), at 119-20.
88. 378 F.2d at 835. Moreover, the threat of bankruptcy to the defendant was not
realized. See supranote 67.
89. 378 F.2d at 839. Judge Friendly specifically noted that damages would run into
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expressed the court's view that it had the gravest difficulty in
perceiving how such a multiplicity of actions throughout the
nation could be administered so as to avoid "overkill." 90 Specifically, the court found jury instructions regarding punitive damages awards in other actions to be an inadequate safeguard. 91 In
this regard, the court noted that a jury was incapable of knowing
what punitive damages, if any, other juries in other states may
92
award in actions yet untried.
Despite the danger that multiple awards may result in a defendant being punished in a manner which is disproportionate
to his wrongdoing, Judge Friendly also observed that the court
was unaware of any legal principle whereby the first punitive
damages award exhausts all potential future awards. 93 Furthermore, the court did not think it was fair or practicable to limit
punitive damages recoveries to some indeterminate number of
first-comers to court.94 The Second Circuit found no basis either
in law or equity for determining that some plaintiffs should recover punitive damages while other equally worthy plaintiffs
95
receive nothing.
Since Judge Friendly opined the Second Circuit's decision in
Roginsky, the mass tort punitive damages problem has been the
subject of some commentary by writers and other courts. 96 How-

the tens of millions of dollars, as contrasted with the maximum criminal penalty for such

conduct under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of not more than 3 years imprisonment
or a $10,000 fine or both. Id. See Putz & Astiz, supra note 1, at 21-23.
90. 378 F.2d at 839.
91. Id.
92. Id. Judge Friendly also found that jury instructions regarding previous awards of
punitive damages to be inadequate. He noted that it was unrealistic to expect a judge in
one state to tell a jury that their fellow townsmen should get little or nothing in the way
of punitive damages because someone else in another state had already recovered punitive damages from the defendant. He found it even more unrealistic to expect a jury to
follow such an instruction. Id. at 840.
93. 378 F.2d at 839. The court failed to find a limitation in the principles of res judicata or due process.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 840. In a telling footnote, Judge Friendly noted that "[ilf there were any way
in which all cases could be assembled before a single court, as in a limitation proceeding
in admiralty, it might be possible for a jury to make one award to be held for appropriate
distribution among all successful plaintiffs." Id. at 839-40 n.11.
96. See, e.g., Dalkon Shield, supra note 4, 526 F. Supp. at 898-900; Wangen v. Ford
Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 295-98, 294 N.W.2d 437, 455-57 (1980). See also supra note 1. For
an excellent discussion of the treatment of punitive damages in products liability, see
Sullivan, Products Liability: Punitive Damages, in DEALING WITH DAMAGES 119 (N. Itzkoff ed. 1983).
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ever, there has been little legislative action and few court decisions which have developed ways of dealing with these pro-

blems.97 Most courts have adhered to the traditional devices

98
available for controlling excessive amounts of punitive damages.
Traditional devices and procedures, however, are less effective in
the mass tort context.
One method used by courts to achieve control over punitive
damages awards is the exercise of their remittitur power to reduce
excessive judgments.9 9 Although remittitur may alleviate some
of the burden on defendants facing mass liability by enabling
the reduction of clearly excessive awards, it is insufficient to
insure that the proper amount of punishment will be meted out
in a mass tort case. 100 The existence of hundreds or thousands of
suits and claims at various stages in litigation make it difficult,
if not impossible, to determine how much punishment has already
been or is about to be imposed on a defendant. Thus, a judge has
no basis for determining what the total amount of punitive damages assessed against a defendant will be, and accordingly, a
judge has no basis upon which to reduce a particular judgment.
Another procedure that has been used by courts in an attempt
to control excessive punitive damages awards is to instruct the

97. The United States Congress recently addressed the issue of punitive damages,
especially in the area of products liability, but no measures were enacted. A House Resolution sponsored by Rep. Shumway proposed a limitation on an individual plaintiffs
punitive damages award to the lesser of twice the plaintiffs compensatory damages or
one million dollars. H.R. Res. 5214, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). An earlier House Resolution, H.R. Res. 7921, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1980), proposed the adoption of a Federal
Uniform Product Liability Act, based on the Model Uniform Product Liability Act promulgated by the U.S. Department of Commerce. 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979). Although this
resolution was not reported out of the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, a
similar Senate bill was introduced by Sen. Kasten. S. 2631, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
This bill required a higher standard of proof for the recovery of punitive damages in
products liability cases. Id. § 13(A)(2). It also provided that the jury determine defendants' liability for punitive damages, but the judge assess the amount of the award. Id.
§ 13(B)(1). The Kasten bill was reported out of the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science and Transportation with amendments on Dec. 1, 1982, but was not enacted into

law. S. REP. No. 670,97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1982). See Note, supra note 14, at 475-76. For
a judicial response to Judge Friendly, see infra notes 105-18 and accompanying text.
98. E.g., Wangen, 97 Wis. 2d at 297-306, 294 N.W.2d at 457-61. See Sullivan, supra note
96, at 132-35.
99. Remittitur allows trial and review courts in their discretion to reduce punitive
damages awards which they view as excessive. See Wangen, 97 Wis. 2d at 303, 294
N.W.2d at 461; Owen II, supra note 22, at 58. See also 22 AM. JUR. 2D, Damages § 366, at
472 (1965); 5 AM. Jum 2D, Appeal and Error§ 942, at 367-70 (1965).
100. Note, supranote 14, at 475.
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jury that both the amount of punitive damages which have
already been assessed against the defendant and the number of
pending claims are relevant to its determination of the amount of
punitive damages which should be awarded in the case before
it.101 This procedure, however, also has serious defects. As the
Second Circuit indicated in Roginsky, it is unreasonable to
expect a jury in one state to deny punitive damages to a particular plaintiff simply because a plaintiff in another state has
already received an award of punitive damages. 10 2 In addition,
like judges, jurors are incapable of knowing what the outcome of
pending cases will be, and how much, if any, punitive damages
will eventually be awarded. 10 3 Finally, it may be strategically
unwise for the defendant to inform a jury that he has already
been found guilty of willful and wanton misconduct. Clearly such
information may prejudice the jury against the defendant. His
denial of egregious misconduct may influence the jury to make
10 4
an award when they would not have otherwise.
Despite the risk of excessive multiple punitive damages awards,
0 5
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Wangen v. Ford Motor Co.'
allowed a cause of action for punitive damages in a products liability suit. The suit arose out of an automobile accident involving
a 1967 Ford Mustang.1 0 6 The fuel tank of the automobile, designed, manufactured and distributed by the defendant, ruptured
upon impact, causing a fire.'0 7 The four occupants of the car sustained serious injuries, and two of them died as a result of their
injuries. 0 8 Although there were no similar suits pending, Ford

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908, comment (e) (1979):
Another factor that may affect the amount of punitive damages is the existence
of multiple claims by numerous persons affected by the wrongdoer's conduct. It

101.

seems appropriate to take into consideration both the punitive damages that
have been awarded in prior suits and those that may be granted in the future,
with greater weight being given to the prior awards ....
Id. See also Wangen, 97 Wis. 2d at 301, 294 N.W.2d at 459-60.
102. Roginsky, 378 F.2d at 839-40; Note, Mass Liability,supra note 1, at 1806.
103. 378 F.2d at 840.
104. See Morris, supra note 20, at 1195 n.40; Note, Mass Liability, supra note 1, at
1806-07.
105. 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980). See Annot., 13 A.L.R.4th 1(1981).
106. 97 Wis. 2d at 262, 294 N.W.2d at 440.
107. Id. at 263, 294 N.W.2d at 440.
108. Id. Plaintiffs, administrators of the estates of the decedents, alleged survival and
wrongful death causes of action and also sought damages for loss of a child's society and
companionship. Id. at 264-65, 294 N.W.2d at 441. Plaintiffs sought compensatory and
punitive damages from the car manufacturer Ford Motor Co., but only compensatory
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Motor Company argued that punitive damages should not be
allowed in a products liability case because of the potential
danger of multiple awards. 109 The court, however, concluded
that punitive damages were recoverable in a products liability
action and addressed the issue of multiple punitive damages. 1 0
In a cogent reply to the Second Circuit's assertion in Roginsky
that multiple punitive damages awards would lead to catastrophic results, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in a decision authored
by Justice Shirley Abrahamson, stated that existing judicial
controls provide for the fair administraton of multiple punitive
damages awards."' Furthermore, the court stressed that punitive damages serve an important societal function by deterring
and punishing manufacturers of defective products. 112 In the
court's view, traditional judicial controls enable courts to not
only carry out the objectives of punitive damages, but also to
avoid inflicting a disproportionate penalty on the defendant in a
multiple award setting. 1 3

damages from the other named defendants. Id. at 263, 294 N.W.2d at 440.
109. Id. at 265-66, 294 N.W.2d at 441. Ford Motor Co. directed a broad based attack
against the award of punitive damages in a products liability suit. It argued: first, that
punitive damages should only be awarded for intentional or personal torts; second, that
the claim for punitive damages was based on the same elements as gross negligence, a
concept that was abolished in Wisconsin; and finally, that punitive damages were
against the public interest because punishment and deterrence would not be furthered in
a suit which could result in economically and socially undesirable results. Id.
110. Id. at 283-99, 294 N.W.2d at 447457. The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Wangen
decided several significant punitive damages issues. The court of appeals, in an unpublished decision, concluded: (1) punitive damages are recoverable in strict products liability
actions; (2) punitive damages are not recoverable in products liability actions based on
negligence; (3) punitive damages are recoverable in survival actions; (4) punitive damages are not recoverable in wrongful death actions; (5) punitive damages are recoverable
in a parent's action for a child's loss of society and companionship, but not for loss of the
minor's earning capacity and medical expenses, 97 Wis. 2d at 264-65, 294 N.W.2d at 441.
The supreme court affirmed in part and reversed in part. Id. at 319, 294 N.W.2d at 467. It
held: (1) punitive damages are recoverable in products liability actions based on negligence, id. at 271, 294 N.W.2d at 444; (2) punitive damages are recoverable in survival
actions, id. at 311, 294 N.W.2d at 463; (3) punitive damages are not recoverable in wrongful death actions, id. at 315, 294 N.W.2d at 465; and (4) punitive damages are recoverable
in a parent's action for a child's loss of society and companionship and for loss of a
minor's earning capacity and medical expenses. 97 Wis. 2d at 264-65, 294 N.W.2d at 441.
award. Id. at 317, 294 N.W.2d at 466.
111. 97 Wis. 2d at 297-98, 294 N.W.2d at 457.
112. Id. The court explained that the present judicial system could properly determine
the imposition of and the appropriate amount of a punitive damages award.
113. Id. The Court relied on the Department of Commerce Analysis .of Draft Uniform
Product Liability Law, 44 Fed. Reg. 3002 (1979) and the MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIAB4SI
rry ACT § 120, reprintedin Fed. Reg. 62,748 (1979), as authority for the continued viability
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The court listed the following judicial controls as insuring the
proper determination regarding both the imposition and the
amount of punitive damages: adoption of a higher burden of
proof, "clear, satisfactory and convincing," for punitive damages
claims; 114 consideration of defendant's wealth, including its
depletion by compensatory and punitive damages already imposed and pending awards;1 5 and the use of specific factors
which the jury should be instructed to consider in determining
the amount of punitive damages which will effectively serve to
punish and deter the defendant.1 16 The court also noted that
both the trial and appellate court have the power to reduce an
excessive jury award.11 7 Dismissing the Second Circuit's skepticism that state courts may be unwilling to exert sufficient restraint, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reasoned that the need for
punitive damages demanded that state courts exercise critical
11 8
control to insure the fair administration of multiple awards.
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court's discussion refutes
the criticism that state courts are unable and unwilling to impose
stricter standards, the Wangen opinion does not resolve the
major problem posed by multiple punitive damages awards which
is that jurors' and judges' knowledge of past awards and pending claims may be insufficient to determine an appropriate
amount to punish and deter a defendant. The specter of multiple
punitive damages awards in the mass tort context specifically

of punitive damages in a products liability action. 97 Wis. 2d at 296, 294 N.W.2d at 456.
114. 97 Wis. 2d at 299, 294 N.W.2d at 457. The "clear and convincing" standard of
proof for punitive damages has been adopted in other jurisdictions: COLO. REv. STAT.
§ 13-25-127(2) (1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549,20(1) (West Supp. 1981); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 30.925(1) (1979). The proposed federal product liability legislation also suggested this
standard. MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT § 120(A), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg.
62,748 (1979). See Owen II, supra note 22, at 58-59; Sullivan, supra note 96, at 123; Note,
supra note 14, at 476.
115. 97 Wis. 2d at 304, 294 N.W.2d at 459-60. The court noted with approval Professor
Owen's conclusion that consideration of this factor was appropriate. Id. at 304, 294
N.W.2d at 460. See Owen I, supra note 21, at 1319. For a list of jurisdictions recognizing
this procedure, see Sullivan, supra note 96, at 132 n.131.
116. 97 Wis. 2d at 305-06, 294 N.W.2d at 460. The court did not specifically adopt the
factors proposed by Professor Owen and those which were incorporated into the MODEL
UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT § 120, reprintedin Fed. Reg. 62,748 (1979), but indicated
that they were suggested guidelines.
117. 97 Wis. 2d at 306-07, 294 N.W.2d at 461. The remittitur power of both trial and
review courts allows modification of excessive awards. See, e.g., Sturm, Ruger & Co. v.
Day, 594 P.2d 38, 48 (1979), modified, 615 P.2d 621, 624-25 (Alaska 1980), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 894 (1981). See also, Sullivan, supranote 96, at 133.
118. 97 Wis. 2d at 307-08, 294 N.W.2d at 461.
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raises the issue of reconciling the goals of punitive damages with
the need to avoid overkill. However, Justice Abrahamson correctly concluded that punitive damages continue to play a vital
role in modem society and that courts have the resources to control their award. A defendant should not be able to escape liability for punitive damages because many people were injured by a
single product or were victims of a mass disaster.
As the incidents of mass tort litigation increases, the need for
an efficient solution to the punitive damages problem becomes
more critical. The class action is the most viable method to
insure that the total punitive damages award assessed against a
defendant will reflect a proportion of his wealth which will effectively punish him and deter him and others from similar conduct
in the future. 119 The class action remedies the inability of jurors
and judges to consider the totality of past and future punitive
damages awards because all claims are litigated as a class. The
class action also has the advantage of protecting the interests of
plaintiffs as a whole by insuring that all plaintiffs, instead of

119. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. See Kennedy, Class Actions: The Right to Opt Out, 25 ARIz. L.
REV. 3, 79-82 (1983); Wright & Colussi, The Successful Use of the Class Action Device in
the Management of the Skywalks Mass Tort Litigation, 52 UMKC L. REV. 141, 142-43
(1984); Note, Class Certification,supra note 1, at 1151-53; Note, Class Actions, supra note
18, at 1789, 1795-97; Comment, supranote 12, at 404-405.
Three federal district court judges have attempted to use the class action device to deal
with the problem of punitive damages in mass torts. Dalkon Shield, supra note 4, 526 F.
Supp. at 896-900 (Judge Spencer Williams); In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.RD. at 419
(Judge Scott 0. Wright); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., M.D.L. No. 381, Memorandum and Pretrial Order No. 72, at 27-28. (Judge Jack B. Weinstein).
120. E.g., Dalkon Shield, supra note 4,526 F. Supp. at 893; Hernandez v. Motor Vessel
Skyward, 61 F.R.D. 558, 559 (S.D.* Fla. 1973), aff'd mem., 507 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1975)
(certifying a Rule 23(b)(1)(A) class action on the issue of negligence in the preparation of
food or drinking water on a ship). Derived from the English equitable bill of peace, class
actions allowed the trial court to fairly adjudicate multiple claims in one suit. 7 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1751, at 503-11 (1972). See
Chafee, Bills of Peace with Multiple Parties, 45 HARv. L REV. 1297 (1932). A complete
discussion of the development and purposes of class actions is beyond the scope of this
article. For a thorough historical analysis of class actions, see 1 H. NEWBURG, CLASS
ACTIONS § 1004 (1977); 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra,§ 1751; Yeazell, Group Litigation
and Social Context: Toward a History of the Class Action, 77 COLUM L. REV. 866 (1977);
Note, Mechanical and ConstitutionalProblems in the Certificationof Mandatory Multistate Mass Tort Class Actions Under Rule 23, 49 BROOKLYN L. REV. 517, 530-31 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Mass Tort Class Actions]; Note, Developments in the LawClass Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Note, Developments in
the Law].
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some, receive a share of the punitive damages assessed against a
defendant for his outrageous conduct. Furthermore, because the
class action results in the fair administration of multiple punitive damages claims, it vindicates the role of punitive damages
in the mass tort context.
Goals and Prerequisitesof Federal
Class Actions
Class actions were designed, in part, to prevent a multiplicity
of actions in those situations where a large number of people
possess a similar claim. 120 Class actions are intended to promote
judicial economy and uniformity of result. 121 However, these
goals have been tempered by the need to safeguard the procedural due process rights of class members as well as those opposing the class. 122 Therefore, prerequisites to a class action suit
were established to ensure adequate protection of the litigants
123
before subjecting them to a binding judgment.
Class actions in federal court are governed by Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1 24 Most states have an identical or similarly worded class action rule or statute. 125 Rule 23(a)
lists four essential prerequisites to bringing a class action: (1) the
class must be so numerous that joinder of all members is imprac-

121. E.g., American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 550-51 (1974); Dalkon
Shield, supra note 4, 526 F. Supp. at 892. The Advisory Committee's Note to the 1966
amendments to Rule 23 noted that class actions were designed to achieve "economies of
time, effort and expense." Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102 (1966). See 3B J.
MOORE & J. KENNEDY, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
23.01[8] (2d ed. 1982); Comment,
supra note 11, at 384-85.
122. Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D., at 101 (emphasizing the drafter's concern for
procedural fairness in amended Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). See
Kamp, Civil Procedure in the Class Action Mode, 19 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 401, 404-05
(1983).
123. See Kennedy, supra note 119, at 13-14; Putz & Astiz, supra note 1, at 24-25; Note,
Mass Tort Class Actions, supra note 120, at 523-29. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS §§ 41-42 (1982).
124. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. See 7 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1753 (1980).

125. See 1 H. NEWBERG, supra note 120, § 1210(b); Smith, supra note 15, at 8. For a list
of the state class actions statutes, see Note, Multistate Plaintiff Class Actions: Jurisdiction and Certification,92 HARV. L REV. 718, 718-19 nn.7-8 (1979). For a discussion of the
Illinois class action statute, see Forde, Class Actions, Illinois Institute for Continuing
Legal Education (1979); Forde, Illinois' New Class Action Statute, 59 CHI. B. REC. 120

(1977); Forde, Class Actions in Illinois: Toward a More Attractive Forum for this Essential Remedy, 26 DEPAUL L. REv. 211 (1977).

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 15

ticable; (2) there must be common questions of law or fact; (3) the
claims or defenses of the representative parties must be typical
of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative
parties must fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
26
class.1
In addition to the prerequisites of Rule 23(a), any proposed
class action must also properly fall within one of the three categories listed in Rule 23(b). 12 7 Rule 23(b)(1), the "prejudice" class
action provision, permits class actions as a method of obviating
potential prejudice to either class members or those opposing the
128
class which may result from a series of individual actions.
Specifically, Rule 23(b)(1) authorizes class treatment where the
prosecution of separate actions by the class would create a risk
of either: (A) inconsistent adjudications which would establish
incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the
class; or (B) individual adjudications which would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of or impair or impede the interests of
others not parties to the litigation. 129 The latter category,

126. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). The first requirement of Rule 23(a), numerosity, is satisfied
in most mass torts. See, e.g., In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. at 787.
Joinder need not be "impossible," only "impracticable." In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 93
F.R.D. at 421.
The commonality requirement has posed problems for courts in mass torts in light of
the possible individualization of issues and choice of law questions. See Comment, supra
note 11, at 388-93. However, the choice of law problems can be managed by the creation
of sub-classes consisting of all plaintiffs to whom a particular law applies. Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(c)(4). See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. at 788; Note, Mass
Tort Class Actions, supranote 120, at 526-27.
The third requirement, typicality, is met in mass tort suits for punitive damages
because the class representatives' claims "stem from a single event or are based on the
same legal or remedial theory." 7 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 124,
§ 1764. If there is a large pool of plaintiffs, several representative plaintiffs can be named
who will present typical claims. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F.
Supp. at 787-88; Payton v. Abbott Laboratories, 83 F.R.D. 382, 388 (D. Mass. 1979).
The fourth prerequisite, adequacy of representation, requires the court to conduct an
inquiry into the qualifications of counsel for the class representatives and the similarity
of interests between the class representatives and absentees. In re "Agent Orange" Prod.
Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. at 788. For a more complete treatment of the application of Rule
23(a) prerequisites to mass torts resulting in claims for punitive damages, see Note, Class
Actions, supra note 18, at 1803-08.
127. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). See 1 H. NEWBURG, supra note 120, § 1210.
128. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1). Several courts have named this provision the "prejudice"
class action. E.g., Dalkon Shield, supra note 4, 526 F. Supp. at 896; In re "Agent Orange"
Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. at 789. See 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 120,
§ 1772, at 4.
129. A Rule 23(b)(1)(A) class action seeks to prevent the possible adverse effects that
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Rule 23(b)(1)(B), is known as the "limited fund" theory and
involves the situation where "there is a risk that if litigants are
allowed to proceed on an individual basis those who sue first will
deplete the fund and leave nothing for late comers."' 3 0
Rule 23(b)(2) authorizes a class where the party opposing the
class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable
to the class, thereby making final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief appropriate with respect to the class as a
whole. 131 In addition to declaratory relief, monetary relief is
available in Rule 23(b)(2) actions. 132 The final category, Rule
23(b)(3), authorizes class certification where the court finds "that
the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient resolution of the controversy.

' 133

Most class actions involving commercial litigation are

certified under Rule 23(b)(3). This rule also lists four matters pertinent to the court's consideration of the predominance and

individual actions would have on the party opposing the class. In contrast, Rule
23(b)(1)(B) focuses on the potential undesirable effects on class members, rather than on
the party opposing the class. Dalkon Shield, supra note 4, 526 F. Supp. at 896; In re
"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. at 789. See, Note, Mass Tort Class
Actions, supra note 120, at 532-33.
130. A. MILLER, supra note 15, at 43. As explained by Judge Williams: "Class certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) generally is designed to accomplish equitable distribution of
a limited fund to all members of a proposed class who have a claim and whose interest
may otherwise be impaired by damage awards in individual actions that deplete or diminish the fund." Dalkon Shield, supra note 4, 526 F. Supp. at 789; Advisory Comm. Note,
39 F.R.D. 69,101 (1966).
131. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
132. See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 257 (5th Cir. 1974)
(noting that Rule 23(b)(2) is not to be read as "making appropriate only final injunctive
relief'). See also 1 H. NEWBURG, supra note 120, § 1145b, at 243 (monetary relief is
granted in Rule 23(b)(2) actions where the awards are equitable in nature or ancillary to
the general scheme of injunctive relief sought by plaintiffs). Cf. McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. United States Dist. Ct., 523 F.2d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911
(1976); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. at 790; Advisory Comm.
Note, 39 F.R.D. at 102 (Rule 23(b)(2) "does not extend to cases in which the appropriate
final relief relates exclusively or predominantly to money damages.").
133. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The predominance and superiority requirements of Rule
23(b)(3) require courts to pragmatically evaluate the interests of class members. In re
"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., M.D.L. No. 381, Memorandum and Pretrial Order No.
72, at 10. "In general a Rule 23(b)(2) action is appropriate whenever the actual interests of
the parties can be served best by a single action." Id. (quoting 7A C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, supranote 120, § 1177). See also Note, Developments in the Law, supra note 120,
at 1505.
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superiority issues: the interest of class members in individually
controlling the litigation; the extent and nature of currently
pending litigation; the desirability of concentrating the litigation
in the particular forum; and the difficulties likely to be encoun134
tered in the management of the class action.
There are important procedural differences between actions
brought under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) and those brought under
Rule 23(b)(3). In actions brought under Rule 23(b)(3), notice to the
class is required. 135 This mandatory notice requirement can be
expensive and burdensome. 136 In addition, under Rule 23(b)(3),
members of the class have a right to be excluded from the class
upon request. 137 This right to "opt out" of the class, if exercised,
will prevent the court's decision from binding all litigants origi138
nally intended to be covered by the action.
Federal Rule 23 furthers the goals of class actions while protecting the rights of the litigants. In cases which meet the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) and one of the categories listed in Rule
23(b), a class action will bind the class members to a single
judgment and will serve judicial economy by avoiding multiple
suits. 1 39 Class actions are an exception to the due process requirements of personal jurisdiction, notice and an opportunity to be

134. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp.
at 790.
135. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). Rule 23(c)(2) also provides that discretionary notice may
be given in Rule 23(b)(1) or Rule 23(b)(2) actions. See Note, Class Actions: Certification
and Notice Requirements,68 GEO. L.J. 1009, 1028 (1980).
136. In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), the United States Supreme
Court interpreted the notice provisions of Rule 23(c)(2). The Court required individual
notice sent to reasonably identifiable absentee class members in 23(b)(3) actions. Id. at
176-77. See Kennedy, supra note 119, at 21-22.
137. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(A). The "opt-out" provision of Rule 23(b)(3) actions has led
commentators to label this action as "voluntary" or "permissive." Kennedy, supra note
119, at 14-15; Wright & Colussi, supra note 119, at 142 n.5; Note, Developments in the
Law, supra note 120, at 1318-22. Courts and commentators also refer to Rule 23(b)(1)(B)
actions as "mandatory." In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175,1180, 1191 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., M.D.L. No.
381, Memorandum and Pretrial Order No. 72, at 18; Kennedy, supra; Wright & Colussi,
supra. Additionally, courts prefer a mandatory class action over a voluntary action. A
class which can be certified under either Rule 23(b)(1) or Rule 23(b)(3) should be certified
under Rule 23(b)(1). Reynolds v. National Football League, 584 F.2d 280, 284 (8th Cir.
1978). See 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MnHIEK supranote 120, § 1772, at 7-8.
138. 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MnImER, supranote 120, § 1783.
139. See, eg., American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. at 550-51; Dalkon Shield,
supra note 4, 526 F. Supp. at 892-95. See Frankel, Some PreliminaryObservationsConcerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39,46 (1967); Williams, 98 F.R.D. at 325-28. See also Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3).
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heard. 140 However, sufficient commonality of interest and adequate representation ensure that the rights of absent class mem41
bers will be fully and constitutionally protected.
DISCUSSION

The Application of Rule 23 to Punitive
Damages in Mass Tort Litigation
In mass tort litigation where there are multiple punitive damages claims brought against one or several defendants, the Rule 23
class action is an appropriate form of litigation. 142 The type of
federal class action utilized to determine liability for, and the
amount of, punitive damages may depend on the nature of the
remedy. Generally, courts and commentators have stated that a
Rule 23(b)(1)(A) class action does not apply to actions for damages because the risk of payment of damages does not establish
"incompatible standards of conduct" that would prejudice a defendant. 143 Rule 23(b)(2) actions are appropriate where injunctive or declaratory relief is requested, but not where money damages is the only relief sought. 44 Finally, Rule 23(b)(3) actions
may be ineffective in some cases if too many individual plain-

140. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40-41 (1940); See Kennedy, supra note 119, at 14;
Putz & Astiz, supra note 1, 24-25. "[A]dequate representation, and not presence, is the
foundation of due process in the class suit." Dalkon Shield, supra note 4, 526 F. Supp. at
905 n.71. See also Comment, The Importance of Being Adequate: Due Process Requirements in Class Actions Under FederalRule 23, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1217, 1233-34 (1975).
141. See Dalkon Shield, supra note 4, 526 F. Supp. at 905; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 41(2) (1982).
142. See Wright & Colussi, supra note 119, at 14243. The class action also offers
advantages over other forms of litigation. For an analysis of the various alternatives to
class actions and their inapplicability to mass tort litigation, see In re "Agent Orange"
Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. at 784-85; Note, Mass Tort Class Actions, supra note 120,
at 567-70; Note, Class Certification,supra note 1, at 1149-51; Comment, Mass Accident
Class Actions, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1624-33 (1972).
143. See, e.g., Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1340 (9th Cir. 1976);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States Dist. Ct., 523 F.2d 1083 1086 (9th Cir. 1975); In
re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. at 789; Causey v. Pan Am World
Airways, 66 F.R.D. 392, 398 (E.D. Va. 1975). See also A. MILLER, supra note 15, at 43.

However, some courts have certified Rule 23(b)(1)(A) class actions in limited fund situations. See, e.g., In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. at 42A; Coburn v. 4-R Corp., 77
F.R.D. 43,46 (E.D. Ky. 1977); Hernandez v. Motor Vessel Skyward, 61 F.R.D. 558, 561 n.8
(S.D. Fla. 1973). See also 1 H. NEWBERG, supra note 120, § 1135k; Note, Mass Tort Class
Actions, supra note 120, at 531-32 nn.82, 83.
144. See supranote 132.
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tiffs opt out and pursue independent litigation. 45 The limited
recovery fund may be exhausted unless all the claimants are
joined in a single suit.
In contrast, certifying a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class action would
effectively manage the limited fund created by multiple punitive
damages claims. The requirements of this category are met
because the interests of subsequent plaintiffs would be impaired
if the defendant's assets were depleted by the payment of numerous punitive damages awards or if a court determined that the
amount of punitive damages assessed against a defendant were
limited by law.146 Only a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) action would bind all
the claimants to the limited fund, thereby controlling the total
amount of punitive damages which are assessed to punish a
defendant. 14 7 The class action has been utilized in the following
three cases where federal district courts have attempted to deal
fairly with the problems posed by multiple punitive damages
claims in the mass tort context. Of particular significance are
the standards that the courts used to determine whether there is
a limited fund.
Dalkon Shield
In In re Northern District of California "Dalkon Shield" IUD
ProductLiability Litigation,("Dalkon Shield"),148 Judge Spencer
Williams was one of the first to use the class action in an
attempt to alleviate the problems presented by the specter of
multiple punitive damages claims in a mass tort context. Judge
Williams certified the class under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) on the basis
that there was a limited fund available for payment of punitive
149
damages claims.
The Dalkon Shield litigation arose out of the manufacture and

145. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text. See also Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1339 (9th Cir. 1976); Dalkon Shield, supra note 4, 526 F.
Supp. at 906; Note, ClassActions, supra note 18, at 1800.
146. Dalkon Shield, supra note 4, 526 F. Supp. at 897-98; Wright, 98 F.R.D. at 333. See
infra notes 280-84 and accompanying text.
147. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., M.D.L No. 381, Memorandum and Pretrial Order No. 72, at 27; Wright & Colussi, note 119, at 142-43; Note, Class Actions, supra

note 18, at 1800.
148. 526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated and remanded, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. denied sub nom. A.H. Robins Co. v. Abed, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983).
149. Id. at 896. Judge Williams certified the Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class sua sponte. Id. at
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distribution of an interuterine contraceptive device called the
"Dalkon Shield. 150 The Dalkon Shield was invented in 1968.151
It was clinically tested from September, 1968 until November,
1969 and was then commercially introduced to the medical profession by Dalkon Corporation. 52 In 1970, A.H. Robins, a manufacturer and distributor of pharmaceuticals, acquired all rights
to the Dalkon Shield. 153 It began its own testing of the device
and simultaneously began to market it.

54

During the period

when it was marketed by A.H. Robins, some 2.2 million Dalkon
1 55
Shields were inserted in women in the United States.
A large number of the women who used the Dalkon Shield had
adverse reactions to the device. 156 Injuries allegedly caused by
its use included uterine perforations, infections, pregnancies,
spontaneous abortions, fetal injuries and hysterectomies. 157 At
the time Dalkon Shield was decided, there were 165 tort actions
pending against A.H. Robins in the Northern District of California alone. 158 In addition, there were more than 1,500 similar
1 59 Most of
suits pending in other courts throughout the country.

1 60
these suits sought punitive damages.
Judge Williams recognized the serious problems associated
with administration of the multiplicity of punitive damages
claims pending against A.H. Robins. The court determined that
certification of a "limited fund" class action was an appropriate
manner to deal with the issue of punitive damages. 16' The court

894-96.
150.
151.
152.

See Williams, 98 F.R.D. at 332.
526 F. Supp. at 892.
Id.
Id.

153. Id.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id.
Id. at 893.
Id.
Id.

158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. For a more detailed discussion of the facts surrounding the "Dalkon Shield"
litigation, see Van Dyke, The Dalkon Shield: A "Primer"in IUD Liability, 6 W. ST. U.L.
REV. 1 (1978).
161. 526 F. Supp. at 897-900. Judge Williams concluded:
Without a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class action, the individual and cumulative awards of
punitive damages may reach astounding amounts. How often is the defendant
to be punished? Under the doctrine of punitive damages there is no limiting rule
in such a situation. There is no fair way to guide the juries. There is no basis for
priority to punitive damages among the claimants, or for awarding such dam-

428
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therefore certified a nationwide mandatory class action under
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) on the issue of punitive damages and declared it
binding on all persons with present or future punitive damages
claims against A.H. Robins arising out of injuries caused by the
162
Dalkon Shield.
In determining that class certification was appropriate, the
court examined both the threshold requirements for maintenance
of all class actions contained in 23(a) and the specific requirements of 23(b)(1)(B). The court found that the punitive damages
16 3
issue met the prerequisites for Rule 23(b)(1)(B) certification.
The court noted that Rule 23(b)(1)(B) requires that the prosecution of separate actions will create a risk of "adjudications with
respect to individual members of the class which would as a
practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or
impede their ability to protect their interests."1 64 This rule is
generally designed to accomplish equitable distribution of a limited fund and to prevent impairment of individual interests through
depletion of the fund. 65 The court stressed that Rule 23(b)(1)(B)
certification does not require proof that claims will "certainly"
exhaust the fund, but merely requires a showing that individual
actions "may" affect the claims of parties not before the court. 166
The court stated that such a showing was made in the Dalkon
Shield litigation. The court noted that claims totaling in excess
of three billion dollars had already been filed against the
defendant. A.H. Robins had assets totaling only 280 million dollars. 67 The court found that there was good reason to believe
that the total amount of the judgments could exceed the defend-

ages to one or more and not to others. In light of the obvious application of
punitive damages in the products liability context, the class action device is the
Id. at 900. best available device to protect the interests of all parties.
162. Id. at 903. The court also certified a statewide Rule 23(b)(3) class action on the
issue of the defendant's liability for compensatory damages. Judge Williams stated that
the court was "exercising its broad discretion to eliminate repetitious litigation" surrounding the issue of the defendant's liability. Id. at 896. He stressed, however, that all
plaintiffs would have the option of opting out of the statewide class action. In addition, if
the class were successful, each plaintiff would return to her own court for a determination

of individual issues such as damages, causation, and other affirmative defenses. Id.
163. Id. at 897.
164. Fed. R Civ. Pro. 23(b)(1)(B).
165.
166.
require
167.

526 F. Supp. at 897. See supranote 129.
526 F. Supp. at 897. Neither Rule 23(b)(1) nor the Advisory Committee's Note
that exhaustion of a limited fund be certain.
Id.
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ant's ability to satisfy them. 1 68 Therefore, the court determined
that because it could not be said with certainty that the defendant would be able to satisfy all the judgments in toto there was a
limited fund at issue.1 69 The court found that a fund c6uld-potentially be exhausted by some claimants which would impair the
rights of non-parties. Accordingly, the court held that the determination of the defendant's liability for punitive damages was
170
maintainable as a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class action.
The court offered an alternative rationale in support of its conclusion that there was a "limited fund" available for recovery of
punitive damages. It concluded that there was some implied-inlaw ceiling on the amount of punitive damages that may be
assessed against a defendant for the same conduct. 171 Thus, at
some point a determination will be made that a defendant has
been adequately punished for its wrongdoing and that no more
punitive damages may be assessed. 172 As a result, the fund
17 3
available for punitive damages awards is limited.
Skywalk Cases
The innovative class action approach utilized by Judge Spencer
Williams in Dalkon Shield was followed by Judge Scott Wright

168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. Judge Williams cited Coburn v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1977), in
support of this use of the limited fund class action. Coburn arose out of a fire at a supper
club which injured 50 to 60 persons and killed 164. Id. at 44. In that case, claims in excess
of $1.5 billion were filed against a defendant with assets totaling approximately $3 million. Id. at 45. The Coburn court rejected the idea that punitive damages should be recovered by claimants on a first-come, first-serve basis. Thus, it characterized the defendants
assets as a limited fund and permitted maintenance of a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class action. Id.
Judge Williams found the Coburn court's reasoning persuasive. 526 F. Supp. at 897. He
determined that in the Dalkon Shield litigation, because of the defendants' limited assets
and the substantial number of claims, the threat of "constructive bankruptcy" was great.
Thus, he found that Rule 23(b)(1)(B) certification was the best way to avoid the "race to
the courthouse" syndrome. Id.
171. 526 F. Supp. at 898.
172. Id. As further justification for the implied-in-law limit to punitive damages,
Judge Williams observed that defendants have a due process right to be protected against
unlimited punishment for the same conduct. He stated: "overlapping damage awards
violate that sense of 'fundamental fairness' which lies at the heart of constitutional due
process." Id. at 899. See supranote 62.
173. 526 F. Supp. at 898. Although plaintiffs have no right to punitive damages, they
have a right to seek punitive damages. Id. at 898 n.37. See Note, Class Actions, supra
note 18, at 1790.
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of the Western District of Missouri in In re Federal Skywalk

Cases, ("Skywalk").174 Skywalk involved the mass tort litigation
which arose out of the collapse of two skywalks in the lobby of
the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Kansas City, Missouri in 1981.175 At
the time the Skywalk decision was rendered, approximately 150
civil lawsuits had been filed which sought compensatory damages awards in excess of one billion dollars and punitive damages awards in excess of 500 million dollars. 176 The defendants
to these actions were protected by 333 million dollars of liability
insurance coverage and the court ascertained the defendant's
177
approximate net worth by way of in camera revelation.
The court determined that a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class action was a
superior method of dealing with the issue of punitive damages in
the Skywalk litigation. 178 First, the court specifically examined
each of the class action prerequisites contained in Rule 23(a). It
found that the numerosity requirement had easily been met in
light of the fact that 113 persons were killed, 212 persons were
injured, and that approximately 1,500 to 2,000 persons were in
the hotel lobby at the time of the collapse. 179 In finding that the
commonality requirement had been met, the court stressed that
although Rule 23(a)(2) requires that there are significant common questions of law or fact, it does not require that all questions of law or fact be common or that common issues predominate.18 0 Furthermore, because all of the claims arose out of the

174. 93 F.R.D. 415 (W.D. Mo.), vacated, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
342(1982).
175. Id. at 419.
176. Id.
177. Id. There were three defendants named in the suits: 1) Hyatt Corp., 2) Hallmark
Cards Corp., and 3) Crown Redevelopment Corp.

178.

The court stated:

The magnitude of the litigation spawned by the collapse of two skywalks challenges this Court to administer these eases with flexibility and imagination.

While other procedural vehicles might provide adequate guidelines for resolution of the complex issues posed by these cases, the circumstances of this litigation compel this court to adopt the far superior procedures of Rule 23 for the
resolution of the many claims arising out of an unfortunate tragedy.
Id. at 420.
179. Id. at 421. Judge Wright stressed that it is only necessary that joinder of all
members of the class be "impracticable" but not "impossible." He found a sufficient
showing of litigational inconvenience from the separate prosecution of claims to warrantcertification. Id.
180. Id. Judge Wright made special note that he was aware that the punitive damages
liability issue might require separate treatment for wrongful death and survival claims in
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collapse of the skywalks the operative facts of each claim were
identical.' 8 '
The court also determined that the claims of the named representatives were typical of the claims of the entire class in accordance with the requirement of Rule 23(a)(3). The court noted that
although the amount of damages sought differed, the legal or
182
remedial theories advanced by each claimant were the same.
Finally, the court found that the requirement of adequacy of
representation was satisfied. The court determined that named
class members would act as fiduciaries in protecting the interests
of unnamed class members and had sufficient resources for the
prosecution of the certified claim. 183 Moreover, the class representatives did not have conflicting interests with other class
members, were not motivated by inappropriate reasons, and held
184
a substantial stake in the outcome of the case.
After finding that the Rule 23(a) prerequisites were satisfied,
the court held that a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class action on the issue of
punitive damages was appropriate. 85 Citing Dalkon Shield, the
court noted that where there exists a limited fund out of which to
recover damages, individual class members face a "very real risk
that the winner of the race to the courthouse might be awarded
all the monies available."' 86 The court then specified the reasons
why the fund available for recovery of punitive damages was
limited in Skywalk. First, all the defendants had limited assets
and most were not sufficient to warrant a sizable punitive dam-

the event that it is subsequently determined that punitive damages are not allowed in
wrongful death or survival actions. He noted that the court was prepared to accord
separate treatment of those claims in such a case. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 422.

183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 423. Judge Wright also certified a Rule 23(b)(1)(A) class action on the issue
of liability for compensatory and punitive damages. He noted that a Rule 23(b)(1)(A)
class action is proper if the prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the
class would create a risk of "inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to indi-

vidual members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for
the party opposing the class." Id. He found that the defendant did face a risk of varying
adjudications and that a class action must be certified to acheive unitary adjudication.
The court, however, determined that because there was no limited fund with respect to
compensatory damages, that the settlement of such claims would continue. Because of
the limited fund, it did not allow continued settlement of punitive damages claims. Id. at
423-24. See supra note 143.
186. 93 F.R.D. at 424.
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ages award.18 7 Second, the fund might be limited by Missouri
punitive damages law. Although the issue of the permissibility of
successive punitive damages awards was still an open question,
the court recognized the possibility that such awards could be
prohibited in some future decision. 188 In concluding that there
was a limited fund, the court stated that only "a single classwide
adjudication of the issues of liability for and amount of punitive
damages can protect the interests of every victim in receiving his
18 9
or her just share of any punitive damage award.'
Dalkon Shield and Skywalk on Appeal
The Rule 23(b)(1)(B) limited fund class action approach was
not well-received by either the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit (Dalkon Shield), 90 or the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit (Skywalk).19' Both courts expressed reservations concerning the use of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) as a means to remedy the punitive
damages problem in mass tort cases. 92 Both courts reversed the
district courts' decisions and decertified the punitive damages
classes. 93 The appellate courts' reversals, however, were based
on entirely different reasoning.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the Dalkon Shield decision for two reasons. 194 First, it found that Rule

187. Id.
188. Id. (citing Monsanto v. Parker, (Mo. Ct. App. argued Dec. 9, 1981), dismissed as
moot, 634 S.W.2d 506 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)). Judge Wright noted the uncertainty in Missouri law on this point. Id. at 424-25. He refused, however, to abstain from deciding the
class certification issue until a Missouri Appellate Court decided this issue. He pointed
out that as long as the issue were undecided, "the specter of a limited fund remains." Id.
at 425.
189. Id. Judge Wright also explained that a final consideration bore indirectly on his
decision to certify a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class action. He noted that attorneys who represent
more than one plaintiff face a potential conflict of interest in determining which case to
proceed with first because they may be required to sacrifice the interests of one client over
another. Id. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
190. In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d
847 (9th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Dalkon Shield], cert. denied sub nom. A.H. Robins
Co. v. Abed, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983).
191. In re Federal Skywalks Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342
(1982).
192. Dalkon Shield, supra note 190, 693 F.2d at 850-52, In re Federal Skywalk Cases,
680 F.2d at 1182-84.
193. Dalkon Shield, supra note 190, 693 F.2d at 850-52, In re Federal Skywalk Cases,
680 F.2d at 1183.
194. 693 F.2d at 851.
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23(a) class action prerequisites had not been clearly satisfied, 195
although the court noted that it was "not necessarily ruling out
the class action tool as a means for expediting multi-party product liability actions in appropriate cases." 96 Second, the court
determined that Rule 23(b)(1)(B)'s requirement of a limited fund
had not been adequately demonstrated. 97 The Ninth Circuit
held that the district court had applied an incorrect standard
when it determined that the limited fund requirement was met if
198
separate adjudications "may" affect the rights of non-parties.
The appellate court relied on its earlier decision in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. United States District Court, Central Districtof
California99 in holding that before a 23(b)(1)(B) class may be
certified the record in the case must establish that separate punitive damages awards will "inescapably affect" later awards. 200
The Ninth Circuit stated that the trial record in Dalkon Shield
failed to reveal that individual punitive damages awards would
inescapably affect later awards thereby establishing a limited
fund. 20 ' It found that the district court had erred when it certi195. Id. at 850-51. The court found various difficulties with the commonality, typicality and adequacy of representation prerequisites. First, the court explained that certain
questions of fact regarding the defendant's knowledge of product safety and nondisclosure of information to the public were not entirely common to all plaintiffs. In addition, it noted that the cases involved in the litigation arose in fifty different states which
do not necessarily apply the same punitive damages standards. Id. at 850. With regard to
typicality, the court declared that no single plaintiff or group of plaintiffs could be typical

of all the numerous claims. Id. Finally, the court observed that adequacy of representation also posed a problem. Regardless of the competence of appointed counsel, the court
was hesitant to "force unwanted counsel upon plaintiffs." Id. at 851.

196. Id. at 851. The court concluded, however, that "the combined difficulties overlapping from each of the elements of Rule 23(a) preclude certification in this case." Id.

197. Id. at 852.
198, Id. at 851. The court reiterated later: "Rule 23(b)(1)(B) certification is proper only
when separate punitive damage claims necessarily will affect later claims." Id. at 852.
199. 523 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976).
200. 693 F.2d at 851. The court rejected the defendant's argument that McDonnell
Douglas was inapplicable because it only dealt with Rule 23(b)(1)(B) certification of compensatory damages claims. It held that McDonnell Douglasprecludes certification unless
separate punitive damages awards "inescapably will affect later awards." Id. The court
noted:

The detrimental effect of earlier claims upon later claims commends itself to this
court as worthy of future judicial and legislature consideration. As plaintiffs in this
case correctly argue, though, not every plaintiff will prevail and not every plaintiff
will receive a jury award in the amount requested. Thus on the present state of the
record, the detrimental effect of separate punitive damages awards is not clearly
inescapable.
Id.
201.

Id. at 851-52. The court determined that it was not clear that there was a "limited
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fled the class action without first obtaining sufficient evidence
concerning the defendant's actual assets, insurance, settlement
experience, and continuing exposure. 20 2 The appellate court also
rejected the district court's holding that there was a limited fund
as a result of an implied-in-law ceiling on the total amount of
punitive damages which can be assessed against any one defendant. The Ninth Circuit found no evidence that such a rule of law
203
exists.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit vacated the class
action certification in the Skywalk litigation on grounds differing from those employed by the Ninth Circuit in Dalkon
Shield.20 4 The Eighth Circuit did not reach the issue as to whether
Rule 23 requirements for class certification had been met. Instead,
its decision relied on the Anti-Injunction Act 20 5 which prohibits
federal courts from enjoining state court proceedings except
under limited and enumerated circumstances. 20 6 Although the
appellate court commended the district judge for his "creative
efforts," 20 7 it found that the effect of the class certification order
was to enjoin pending state proceedings by prohibiting plaintiffs
from litigating their punitive damages claims and by prohibiting
the settlement of claims. 208 At the time of this appeal, there were
approximately 120 cases filed in the Missouri state courts and
eighteen cases filed in the federal district courts. 20 9 Thus, the

fund" at issue, or that the rights of non-parties would necessarily be altered by the maintenance of separate actions.
202. Id. at 852. The court relied on In re "Agent Orange" Prod. [iab. Litig., 506 F.
Supp. at 789-90, where Rule 23(b)(1)(B) certification was denied because the plaintiffs
offered no evidence of the likely insolvency of the defendants, and on Payton v. Abbott
Laboratories, 83 F.R.D. 382, 389 (D. Mass. 1979), where the court also denied Rule
23(b)(1)(B) certification because the plaintiffs offered no evidence of the likely insolvency
of the defendants. In Payton, the court concluded that "without more, numerous plaintiffs and a large ad damnum clause should [not] guarantee (b)(1)(B) certification." Id. at

389.
203. 693 F.2d at 852. Without elaboration, the court declared that "[a] class action ....
is not the only way to protect a defendant from -unreasonable punitive damages." Id.
204. See In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1183-84 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 342 (1982).
205. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982). The Anti-Injunction Act provides that "[a] court of the
United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as
expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or
to protect or effectuate its judgments." Id.
206. 680 F.2d at 1182-83.
207. Id. at 1184.
208. Id. at 1180.
209. Id. at 1177 n.5.
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court held that the order was prohibited by the Anti-Injunction
0
Act.21
The court refuted the argument that class action certification
was necessary in aid of the court's jurisdiction and thus was
excepted from the Act.2 11 The plaintiffs argued that the circum-

stances in this case were analogous to circumstances which
would support a Rule 22 Interpleader action where injunctions
against state court proceedings are permissible because of the
existence of a limited fund. 212 The court rejected the analogy to
federal interpleader jurisdiction because it found there was no
limited fund.213 It held that a limited fund could not be predicated on uncertain claims for punitive damages mo which the
defendants had not yet conceded liability and, therefore, the
jurisdictional prerequisite was not satisfied. 214 The court further
explained that the Supreme Court had narrowly interpreted the
"necessary in aid of jurisdiction" exception to the Act and that
pending state215suits must "truly interfere with the federal court's
jurisdiction.

In a lengthy and thorough dissent, Judge Gerald Heaney stated
that the district court's decision could be modified such that it
did not violate the Anti-Injunction Act and therefore could satisfy
Rule 23.216 Instead of an absolute prohibition on the pursuit of
state claims, he proposed that the order permit plaintiffs to settle
punitive damages claims. Defendants would then receive a credit
for the amount of such settlements against an eventual class-

210. Id. at 1181.
211. 680 F.2d at 1181-83. Relying on Supreme Court precedents, the court explained
that the Anti-Injunction Act was an absolute prohibition against enjoining state court
proceedings, unless the injunction falls within one of three specifically defined exceptions. Id. at 1181. See Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 630-31 (1977); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Locomotive Engrs, 398 U.S. 281, 286-87 (1970). The three exceptions
are: express congressional authorization, necessary in aid of the court's jurisdiction, and
protection or effectuation of the court's judgments. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982).
212. 680 F.2d at 1182. Federal interpleader fits under the "necessary in aid of jurisdiction" exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. A federal court can enjoin claimants from
prosecuting claims in a state action to protect all claimants to the limited fund. Id.
213. The court stated that the existence of a limited fund was a jurisdictional prerequisite for federal interpleader. Id. Apparently without this prerequisite, the class action
could not be analogized to interpleader and thereby excepted from the Anti-Injunction
Act.
214. Id. at 1182.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1184 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
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wide award of punitive damages. 217
Judge Heaney supported the use of the class action device as
the most efficient mechanism for resolution of the complex problems posed by punitive damages in mass tort cases because it
would avoid a multiplicity of lawsuits on the same issues involving the same facts ind the same defendants. 218 Additionally, he
pointed out that a single classwide adjudication of punitive
damages insures that every victim will receive a just share of
any punitive damages award. 219 Judge Heaney believed that the
existence of a limited fund was established on two bases. First,
he noted that Missouri law may preclude multiple awards of
punitive damages. 220 Second, he stated that the defendants may
221
not have the capacity to satisfy the judgments against them.
Regretably, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in both the Dal222
kon Shield and Skywalk cases.
The "Agent Orange" Litigation
Undaunted by the Courts of Appeals' reversals in Dalkon
Shield and Skywalk, Judge Jack B. Weinstein, Chief Judge of
the Eastern District Court of New York, entered the fray. Judge
Weinstein, a distinguished professor of law and commentator on
Federal Procedure and Evidence, 223 assumed responsibility for
the Agent Orange litigation when Judge George C. Pratt was
elevated to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

217. Id. at 1184-85 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
218. Id. at 1186 (Heaney, J., dissenting). Judge Heaney emphasized that a single trial
would conserve the resources of both litigants and the judiciary. See also MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.94, at 93 (5th ed. 1982) (recommending coordination of proceedings in simultaneously pending state and federal court cases).
219. 680 F.2d at 1186. (Heaney, J., dissenting).
220. Id. at 1187 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
221. Id. at 1187-88 (Heaney, J., dissenting). In support of class action treatment for
punitive damages in the mass tort context, Judge Heaney relied heavily on Dalkon
Shield.
222. A.H. Robins Co. v. Abed, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983) (Dalkon Shield); In re Federal
Skywalk Cases, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982).
223. Judge Weinstein is presently an Adjunct Professor of Law at Columbia Law
School. His publications include: WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE: COMMENTARY ON RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES (1982); REFORM OF THE COURT

RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES (1977). Judge Weinstein initially opposed the use of class
actions for mass disasters. See Weinstein, Revision of Procedure;Some Problems in Class
Actions, 9 BUFFALO L. REV. 433, 469 (1960). However, a subsequent publication and the
Agent Orange class certification demonstrate that his position has changed. See Weinstein, Some Reflections on the "Abusiveness" of Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 299 (1972).
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In re "Agent Orange" ProductLiability Litigation224 concerns
the claims of Vietnam War veterans and members of their families who allegedly were injured as a result of the veterans' exposure to Agent Orange and other herbicides. 225 Agent Orange is a
chemical that was disseminated in the air over southeast Asia
during the Vietnam War. 226 It was used by United States military forces to defoliate the jungle in that area between 1961 and
1972.227 Plaintiffs sought damages for personal injury and wrongful death from numerous chemical corporations named as defendants who manufactured and supplied Agent Orange to the government. 228 The injuries claimed by the veterans included: severe
skin disorders, liver dysfunction, respiratory problems, neurological problems, cancer and defective genes. 229 Their children claimed
genetic injury and birth defects and the veterans' wives allegedly
230
suffered miscarriages.
At the time that Judge Pratt considered the Agent Orange litigation in 1980, there were approximately 167 suits pending in

224. 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), modified, M.D.L. No. 381, Memorandum and
Pretrial Order No. 72 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1983), petition for mandamus denied sub nom. In
re Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., No. 83-3065 (2d Cir. Jan. 9, 1984), cert. denied sub
nom. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co. v. Ryan, 52 U.S.LW. 3631 (U.S. Feb. 27, 1984).
225. 506 F. Supp. at 768-69. Four groups of plaintiffs, claimed to have suffered injury:
Vietnam veterans, their spouses, their parents, and their children. Id. at 769. The veterans alleged direct injuries. The other groups sought recovery on direct and derivative
claims. Id.
226. Id. at 783. The term "Agent Orange," as used in the litigation, refers collectively
to several formations of pherroxy herbicides that contain highly toxic chemicals. For a
description of the herbicides at issue, see Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co. v. Ryan, No.
83-1174, Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 2 (U.S. filed Jan. 15, 1984); In re "Agent
Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., M.D.L. No. 381, Memorandum and Pretrial Order No. 72
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1983). There were at least six phenoxy herbicides disseminated for
military use in Vietnam. For a complete explanation of these phenoxy herbicides, see
Comment, Agent Orange: Government Responsibility for the Military Use of Phenoxy
Herbicides, 3 J. LEGAL MED. 137, 138-44 (1982) (hereinafter cited as Comment, Agent
Orange: Government Responsibility); Comment, Agent Orange as a Problem of Law and
Policy, 77 N.w. U.L REV. 48, 49-55 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Agent Orange].
227. See Comment, Agent Orange: Government Responsibility,supra note 226, at 139;
Chi. Daily L. Bull., Feb. 27, 1984, at 1, col. 6.
228. 506 F. Supp. at 769. Plaintiffs asserted numerous theories of liability, including
strict products liability, negligence, breach of warranty, intentional tort and nuisance. Id.
See e.g., Sixth Amended Verified Complaint at 10, 15, 17, 22, 24, Ryan v. Dow. Chem. Co.,
No. 79 C747 (E.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 21, 1983).
229. For a description of the health problems allegedly caused by Agent Orange, see
Comment, Agent Orange: Government Responsibility,supra note 226, at 145-49.
230. 506 F. Supp. at 769. Some family members sought recovery on derivative claims;
others claimed direct injuries.
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the federal courts involving over 3,400 plaintiffs and nineteen
defendants. 231 After dismissing the defendants' third party claims
against the United States, 232 the court concluded that the class
action device was the most flexible and efficient procedure to
manage this complex case. 233 Granting a conditional class certification order, 234 the court ruled that the suit should proceed as
a class action under Rule 23(b)(3) on the general issues of liability.235

However, there was no separate treatment of the damages

issues, including punitive damages, at this initial stage of litigation.
Upon reconsideration of the conditional certification, Judge
Weinstein modified Judge Pratt's ruling and certified the class
on all issues of liability and damages under Rule 23(b)(3) and on
231. Id. at 783. The plaintiffs came from the fifty states, Australia and New Zealand,
Id. For a list of the named defendants, see id. at 768 n.2.
232. Id. The defendants sought to implead the United States as a third-party defendant under theories of contribution or indemnity. Id. at 768-69. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 14. The
government claimed "intra-military immunity" under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139-40 (1950) (deciding that the Federal Tort
Claims Act did not waive sovereign immunity with respect to claims of servicemen arising out of activities "incident" to their military service). Applying the Feres doctrine, the
court held that the plaintiffs' claims were "incident to and arising out of service" and,
therefore, did not subject the government to liability. 506 F. Supp. at 780-81.
233. 506 F. Supp. at 785. Judge Pratt thoroughly discussed the legal problems engendered by this "unprecedented controversy," including the large number of potential plaintiffs, the choice of law problems, the difficult causation issues, and inconclusive scientific
data. Id. at 783. He noted:
All of these problems are compounded by the practical realities of having on
one side of the litigation plaintiffs who seek damages, but who have limited
resources with which to press their claims and whose plight becomes more desperate and depressing as time goes on, and having on the other side defendants
who strenuously contest their liability, who have ample resources for counsel
and expert witnesses to defend them, and who probably gain significantly,
although immeasurably, from every delay-that they can produce.
Id. at 784. The court discussed various procedural devices available to manage the litigation. Id. at 784-85. In deciding to follow the class action approach, the court concluded
that the technical problems with this device in the context of a mass tort could be overcome. Id. at 785.
234. 506 F. Supp. at 787. The court indicated that the conditional certification order
could be later modified in light of future developments in the case pursuant to Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 23(c)(1) and 23(d).
235. Id. at 787. The court thoroughly addressed the prerequisites of Rules 23(a) and
23(b) and concluded that certification under Rule 23(b)(3) was appropriate. Id. at 788-791.
According to the case management plan adopted, the court also recommended separate
trials on some issues, including the government contract defense. Id. at 785. The plaintiff
class was defined as all "persons who claim injury from exposure to Agent Orange and
their spouses, children and parents who claim direct or derivative injury therefrom." Id.
at 788. Additionally, the court suggested that subclasses may be created later to resolve
certain issues. Id.
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439

the issue of punitive damages under Rule 23(b)(1)(B). 236 Judge
Weinstein found that a Rule 23(b)(3) class action on liability and
damages was appropriate because the affirmative defenses and
questions of general causation were common to the class; those
questions predominated over questions affecting individual members; and a class action was the superior method of adjudication
237
given the enormous potential size of the class.

Plaintiffs had also sought certification of a mandatory class
action under Rule 23 (b)(1)(B). 238 Before determining whether to
certify the class under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), the court addressed two
threshold questions: First, whether Rule 23(b)(1)(B) should ever
be used in mass tort litigation, and second, assuming that it
should, what standard should be used to determine whether
2 39
there is a risk that the earlier litigants may deplete the fund.

In addressing the first question, the court cited a number of cases

236. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., M.D.L. No. 381, Memorandum and Pretrial Order No. 72, at 2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1983). In certifying both classes, Judge Weinstein emphasized that the class action device was appropriate in this mass tort: first,
because of the potential size of plaintiffs' class; second, because of the need to assure that
the financial burden would fairly fall on the party which should bear it; and finally,
certification might encourage settlement. Id. at 3-5.
237. Id. at 16. The court rejected the defendant's contention that the causation issues
were not common to the class and did not predominate because of different exposure to
Agent Orange. Defendants had supported their argument by relying on the Advisory
Committee's Note on Rule 23 and several cases that had denied Rule 23(b)(3) certification
for mass torts. Id. at 7-9. See Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. 69 (1966); Payton v. Abbott
Laboratories, No. 76-1514-5 (D. Mass. Oct. 3, 1983) (DES claims); Mertens v. Abbott
Laboratories, C-80-223, slip op. at 9 (D.N.H. July 27, 1983) (DES claims); Yandle v. PPG
Indust., Inc., 65 F.R.D. 556, 571 (E.D. Tex. 1974) (employees at asbestos plant). In deciding that common questions predominate, however, the court stated that a pragmatic evaluation of the interest of class members should be given great weight. M.D.L. No. 381,
Memorandum and Pretrial Order No. 72, at 9-10. The court concluded that the trial would
"emphasize critical common defenses applicable to the plaintiffs class as whole," including the government contract defense and the issue of general causation. Id. at 10-11, 13.
Moreover, the court dismissed the choice of law problems, noting that there existed a
consensus among the states with respect to the rules of conflicts which provided "a
national substantive rule governing the main issues in this case." Id. at 14. See In re
"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., M.D.L. No. 381, Preliminary Memorandum on Conflicts of Law, Pretrial Order No. 87 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 1984). For a discussion of the Rule
23(b)(3) certification, and the causation and conflicts of law issues, see Birnbaum &
Srabel, supra note 7, at 39-40.
238. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., M.D.L No. 381, Memorandum and Pretrial Order No. 72, at 18 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1983). Plaintiffs' request for certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(1)(A) was denied because the risk of paying money damages to some
claimants and not others did not satisfy the rule's prerequisites. Id. at 16-18.
239. Id at 20.
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in which Rule 23 (b)(1)(B) was used in mass tort litigation240
and noted that although the court of appeals' decisions in Dalkon Shield and Skywalk had decertified the classes, both courts
had recognized the applicability of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) certification
in mass tort litigation. 24 1 The court distinguished Dalkon Shield
on the basis that neither plaintiffs nor defendants had supported
class certification. 242 The court next distinguished Skywalk because the Eighth Circuit's decision was based on the narrow
grounds that the district court's certification order violated the
Anti-Injunction Act. 243 Finding neither of these considerations

applicable in the Agent Orange litigation, the court determined
that Rule 23(b)(1)(B) may be used in the mass tort context. 244
As to the second question, the determination of when the
danger of fund exhaustion justified certification, the court rejected the Ninth Circuit's standard in Dalkon Shield that certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) is appropriate only when "separate
punitive damage claims necessarily will affect later claims. ' ' 245
The court found that the Ninth Circuit's strict standards were at
odds with the statutory language of Rule 23(b)(1) which only
requires that there be a risk of impairment-not that there be a
conclusive determination of that fact. 246 In considering the par-

240. Id. See, e.g., Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp. 541 F.2d 1335, 1340 n.9 (9th Cir.
1976); Coburn v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43, 45 (E.D. Ky. 1977), petition for mandamus denied
sub nom. United Light, Heat & Power Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 588 F.2d 543 (6th

Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 443 U.S. 913 (1979); Hernandez v. Motor Vessel Skyward, 61
F.R.D. 558,559 (S.D. Fla. 1973), affid mem., 507 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1975).
241. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., M.D.L. No. 381, Memorandum and Pretrial Order No. 72, at 20.
242. Id. at 21. In Dalkon Shield, the Ninth Circuit had remarked that no plaintiffs or
defendants had supported the certification of the nationwide Rule 23(b)(1)(B) punitive
damages class, although one of the plaintiffs for the Rule 23(b)(3) California liability
class had favored certification. 693 F.2d at 849-50. However, one defendant had moved for
certification of the nationwide punitive damages class at the district court after the court
had conditionally certified that class. 526 F. Supp. at 895. The Ninth Circuit did not base
its decision on the lack of support for class certification, but reversed on other grounds.
See supra notes 195-97 and accompanying text.
243. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., M.D.L No. 381, Memorandum and Pretrial Order No. 72, at 21. There was no possibility of violating the Anti-Injunction Act in
this case because there were no state cases pending.
244. Id.
245. Id. The court added that strict adherence to the Ninth Circuit certainty standard
would mean the elimination of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) certification for mass torts or require a
pretrial determination on the merits, a practice which the Supreme Court disapproved of
in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1974).
246. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., M.D.L. No. 381, Memorandum and Pretrial Order No. 72, at 22.
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ticular facts of the litigation before it, the court enunciated the
proper standard in determining whether a limited fund exists
under Rule 23(b)(1)(B): "[W]hether there is substantial probability-that is less than a preponderance but more than a mere
possibility -that if damages are awarded, the claims of earlier
litigants would exhaust the defendants' assets. 247
To decide whether a substantial probability of exhaustion of a
limited fund did exist, a special master had been directed to conduct
a limited evidentiary hearing. 248 The master reviewed defendants' net worth and the nature and extent of damages in the
pending cases. 249 Based on the available information, the master
found that the evidence did not support the view that provable
claims would exhaust the defendants' assets. 250 On this basis, the
court refused to certify a class for compensatory damages. 25 ' As to
punitive damages, the court concluded that if punitive damages
were added to the potential compensatory damages, the defendants' assets may well be exhausted. 25 2 This did not end the
courts inquiry into class certification for the punitive damages
claims, however.
The court properly concluded that the issue as to a limited
fund for punitive damages claims should not be determined
merely by ascertaining whether the defendants have the financial capability to satisfy all claims. 25 3 Rather, a court must consider the issue of a limited fund in relation to the rationale

247. Id. at 23.
248. Id. at 24.
249. Id. at 24-25. The master found that the combined net assets of the defendants
were approximately $9 to $16 billion. Based on the information available, he estimated
that there might be 40,000 to 50,000 claims.
250. Id. at 25.
251. Id. at 26. Judge Weinstein rejected plaintiffs' contention that compensatory damages would exceed the net worth of the defendants.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 27-28. The court observed that there may be a policy against substantial
punitive damages awarded under the particular facts of this case. Id. at 26. A large
award of punitive damages might discourage government contractors from bidding on

future defense contracts. Id. The court noted that awarding punitive damages might
seriously impair the government's ability to formulate policy and make judgments pursuant to its war powers. Id. (citing Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 144 N.J. Super. 1,364 A.2d
43 (1976), aff'd, 154 N.J. Super. 407, 381 A.2d 805 (1977), appeal denied, 75 N.J. 616, 384
A.2d 846 (1978) ). A large punitive damages award would unfairly punish the defendants
if the government knew of the dangers posed by exposure to asbestos and yet avoided all
liability. Id. at 27. See supra note 232. Notwithstanding this argument against punitive
damages, Judge Weinstein concluded that there was a substantial probability that
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underlying the imposition of punitive damages. 25 4 Considering
that the purpose of punitive damages is to punish defendants
and not to compensate plaintiffs, the court noted that if a single
plaintiff recovers punitive damages, that may represent a finding by the jury that the defendant was sufficiently punished for
the wrongful conduct. 255 Therefore, public policy or due process
considerations may limit the number of times a defendant may
be punished for the same transaction. 256 Moreover, future claims
for punitive damages may be reduced by the admission of evidence of prior awards because the injured party is seeking additional punishment for the same misconduct. 25 7 Therefore, the
amount of punitive damages assessed against a defendant may
be limited by the goals underlying punitive damages.
The court enunciated a two-part analysis of the probable risk
standard to determine whether a-limited fund exists which
would justify a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class action. First, the court
must decide whether there is a substantial probablity that earlier claimants would exhaust defendants' assets. 258 Second, as
a matter of policy or due process, the court should decide
whether there is a substantial probability that limited punitive
damages would be awarded. 259 This second prong emphasizes
the fairness to plaintiffs and defendants in awarding punitive
damages in the mass tort context. 2 60 In regard to the second
prong of the analysis, the court concluded that there was a
substantial probability that "adjudication with respect to
individual members of the class.. .would as a practical matter
be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties
to the adjudication. ' 26 1 Accordingly, a punitive damages class

limited punitive damages might be allowed and that it would be equitable to share this
portion of a possible award among all plaintiffs who ultimately recovered compensatory

damages. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., M.D.L. No. 381, Memorandum and
Pretrial Order No. 72, at 27.
254. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., M.D.L. No. 381, Memorandum and Pretrial Order No. 72, at 27-28.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 28.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 23. The court followed the reasoning of Dalkon Shield, supra note 4, 526 F.
Supp. at 897-98, although it articulated the "substantial probability test," in part to protect a large group of war veterans. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., M.D.L. No.
381, Memorandum and Pretrial Order No. 72, at 22-23.
259. Id. at 26-28.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 28.
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was certified under Rule 23 (b)(1)(B). 262
Defendants petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit for a writ of mandamus directing the district court to
vacate the class certification order. 263 Although the Second
Circuit expressed reservations about the appropriateness of
the Rule 23(b)(3) class action as to the existence of a common
issue of general causation 264 and the difficult choice of law
problems, 265 it denied defendants' petition. 266 Defendants then
petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari 267 which also was denied. 268 Neither petition addressed
the issue of the Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class certification for punitive
damages. On the eve of litigation, the court announced a $250
million settlement of the Agent Orange litigation. 269 Following

262. Id. The court indicated that the effect of the Rule 23(b)(1)(B) certification on
plaintiffs' rights to opt out of the Rule 23(b)(3) class did not need to be decided at this
time. Id. at 29. The plaintiff class was defined as:
Those persons who were in the United States, New Zealand or Australian Armed
Forces, injured while in or near Vietnam by exposure to Agent Orange or other
phenoxy herbicides, including those composed in whole or in part of 2, 4, 5trichlorophenoxyacetic acid or containing some amount of 2, 3, 7, 8-tetrachlorodibenzo-dioxin. The class also includes spouses, parents and children of the
veterans born before January 1, 1984, directly or derivatively injured as a result
of the exposure.
Id. at 31. The court also specified elaborate notice provisions including, individual mailings, maintenance of a separate post office box, radio and television announcements,
newspaper and magazine publications, and procurement of a toll-free "800" telephone
number. Id. at 32-35.
263. In re Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., No. 83-3065, Petition for Writ of Mandamus (2d Cir. Dec. 22, 1983).
264. In re Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., No. 83-3065 slip op. at 3 (2d Cir. Jan. 9,
1984).
265. Id. at 6-7. In a previous decision, the Second Circuit had held that plaintiffs'
claims arise under state law, not federal common law. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab.
Litig., 635 F.2d 987, 995 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981), rev'g, 506 F.
Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
266. In re Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., No. 83-3065, slip op. at 1, 8. See Birnbaum
& Srabel, supra note 7, at 39-40.
267. In re Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., No. 83-3065 (2d Cir. Jan. 9, 1984), petition
for cert. filed sub nom., Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co. v. Ryan, (U.S. Jan. 15, 1984).
Defendants advanced similar arguments concerning the causation and choice of law
problems, but also contended that the notice ordered by Judge Weinstein was insufficient
in light of Eisen v. Carlisle & Jaquelin. Id. at 8-11.
268. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co. v. Ryan, 52 U.S.LW. 3631 (U.S. Feb. 27, 1984).
269. Chi. Daily L Bull., May 7, 1984, at 1, col. 3. The proposed settlement provided for
the defendants to pay 180 million dollars to a fund administered by the court in full and
final settlement of the compensatory damages claims of the plaintiff class. In re "Agent
Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., M.D.L. No. 381, Settlement, at 4-5 (E.D.N.Y. May 7,1984).
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preliminary fairness hearings, the court will determine if the
270
proposed settlement should be finally approved.
ANALYSIS
The Limited Fund Class Action Approach for Punitive
Damages in Mass Tort Litigation
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) permits class certification when multiple adjudications would prevent or greatly impede the ability of potential
class members to protect their interests. The language of
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) emphasizes practical considerations and expressly authorizes class adjudication where:
(1) The prosecution of separate actions by or against
individual members of the class would create a risk of
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of
the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive
of the interests of the other members not parties to the
adjudications or substantially impair or impede their abil271
ity to protect their interests.
The language of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) does not specifically require
the existence of a limited fund. However, the Advisory Committee's Note to the 1966 amendment of Rule 23 suggests that a case
in which there are multiple claimants to a limited fund clearly
satisfies the prerequisites of Rule 23(b)(1)(B). 272 Moreover, courts
and commentators have referred to the limited fund situation as
the "paradigm" Rule 23(b)(1)(B) action. 2 73 The existence of a
limited fund poses the risk that earlier litigants will deplete the
274
fund, leaving nothing for late comers.
270.
271.
272.

See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITGATION, supra note 218, § 1.46.
Fed. R Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B).
Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.RD. 69 (1966). The Note provides in pertinent part-

In various situations an adjudication as to one or more members of the class
will necessarily or probably have an adverse practicaleffect on the interests of
other members who should therefore be represented in the law suit. This is
plainly the case when claims are made by numerous persons against a fund
insufficient to satisfy all claims.
Id. at 101 (emphasis added). See Note, Class Certification, supra note 1, at 1157; Note,
ClassActions, supranote 18, at 1797.
273. E.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prods. Liab. Litig., M.D.L. No. 381, Memorandum and

Pretrial Order No. 72, at 19; In re Agent Orange Prods. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. at 789
(quoting A. MILLER, supra note 15, at 45). See Note, ClassActions and Mass Toxic Torts,
8 COLUM. J. OF ENv. LAW 269, 282-83 (1982).
274. A. MILT EK supra note 15, at 45.
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Although the Ninth Circuit in Dalkon Shield disagreed with
the trial court's application of a probable risk of depletion
standard to determine exhaustion of a limited fund, a standard which was also utilized in Agent Orange, neither the
language of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) nor the Advisory Committee's
Note require the certainty standard mandated by the Ninth
Circuit. 275 First, Rule 23(b)(1)(B) states that this action is appro276

of
priate if individual adjudications "would create a risk"
impairing the interests of non-parties. Second, the Advisory
Committee's Note recommends that Rule 23(b)(1)(B) certification is proper where adjudications as277to members of the class
"will necessarily or probably affect"
the interests of potenimpairment of interof
risk
the
Therefore,
members.
tial class
ests 278 or the probability of fund depletion 279 is the correct

standard to measure the exhaustion of a limited fund.
Judge Williams in Dalkon Shield and Judge Weinstein in
Agent Orange explained that a limited fund may be created in
two ways. First, a limited fund may be created because a defendant has finite assets. 280 A defendant risks the depletion of these
assets when faced with the specter of multiple punitive damages
awards. The threat of a defendant's bankruptcy constitutes the
probable risk that this limited fund will be exhausted. 28 1 Courts

must engage in preliminary findings of fact to determine the

275. In Dalkon Shield, the district court stated that a limited fund was potentially
exhaustable if individual actions "may" affect the claims of others. Dalkon Shield, supra
note 4, 526 F. Supp. at 887, 897. The district court in In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab.
Litig., concluded that the danger of fund exhaustion which would justify class certification was whether there is a "substantial probability" that claims of earlier litigants
would exhast the fund. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., M.D.L. No. 381, Memorandum and Pretrial Order No. 72, at 23. Although these standards are not identical, they
would seem to be consistent with the language of the Advisory Committee's Note which
recommends that a class should be certified if interest of potential class members "will
necessarily or probably" be affected by adjudication of the class claims. Advisory Comm.
Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 101 (1966). See Williams, 98 F.R.D. at 334.
276. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (b)(1)(B).
277. Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. 69 (1966).
278. Dalkon Shield, supra note 4, 526 F. Supp. at 897. See In re Federal Skywalk
Cases, 680 F.2d at 1187 n.9 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
279. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., M.D.L. No. 381, Memorandum and Pretrial Order No. 72, at 23.
280. Id.; Dalkon Shield, supra note 4, 526 F. Supp. at 897. Cf. In re "Agent Orange"
Prods. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. at 789-90 (indicating the aggregate claims of the potential class exceed the assets of the defendants).
281. Dalkon Shield, supra note 4,526 F. Supp. at 897.
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existence of defendant's limited assets and to measure the risk of
28 2
exhaustion.
The second approach used to demonstrate the existence of a
limited fund is the restraint on punishing the defendant imposed
or implied by law. Some jurisdictions may limit the number of
times a defendant can be punished by an award of punitive
damages for the same act.283 Other jurisdictions may decide as a

matter of policy or constitutional due process that a defendant
may not be subjected to repeated punishment. 28 4 This implied
restriction on punitive damages based on fairness to the defendant creates a limited fund equally as finite as defendant's assets.
The standard to determine the exhaustion of the legally limited
fund is whether there is a substantial probability that limited
punitive damages will be allowed. 28 5 In most mass torts, regardless of defendant's assets, this substantial probability exists.
Pursuant to the punishment and deterrent goals of punitive
damages, there may well be a determination that the imposition
of only a certain amount of punitive damages is justified. 28 6 In
any mass tort case where there is a substantial probability of
awarding multiple punitive damages, a substantial probability
exists that defendant's liability for punitive damages will be
limited and the legally created fund depleted. According to this
rationale, a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class action is appropriate for all
mass torts involving multiple punitive damages claims because
of the existence of a limited fund implied by law and the substantial probability of its exhaustion.
This same conclusion is reached by interpreting the statutory
language of Rule 23(b)(1)(B). If individual members of the class
received punitive damages awards, this adjudication would practically dispose of the interests of others, not parties to the litigation. 28 7 Without a class action, later plaintiffs' interest in seeking

282. E.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 381, Memorandum and
Pretrial Order No. 72, at 24-26; Dalkon Shield, supra note 4, 526 F. Supp. at 897; Coburn
v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43,45 (E.D. Ky. 1977).
283. See supra note 191 and accompanying text. See also In re Federal Skywalk

Cases, 680 F.2d at 1187 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
284.
285.

See supra note 70. Cf. Dalkon Shield, supra note 190,693 F.2d at 850.
In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 381, Memorandum and Pre-

trial Order No. 72, at 23.
286. Id. at 27-28. See also Dalkon Shield, supra note 4, 526 F. Supp. at 899.
287. Dalkon Shield, supra note 4, 526 F. Supp at 897-98. See Williams, 98 F.R.D. at
333; Note, Class Actions, supranote 18, at 1797.
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punitive damages will be impaired or impeded by prior awards.
The consequent risk of impairment of interests satisfies the
requirements of Rule 23(b)(1)(B).2 88 Whether the basis is the
presence of a limited fund and the substantial probability of its
exhaustion or the risk of impairment of interests of potential
class members, punitive damages in mass tort cases meet the
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) prerequisites for class certification.
An additional reason to certify a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class action
for punitive damages in multiple tort litigation is to advance
the practical objectives of class actions: judicial economy and
fairness. 28 9 A class action would adjudicate the interests of
plaintiffs in one action, thereby resolving the "first comer"
problems. 290 A court could proportionately distribute the punitive damages among class members. 29 1 Class certification on
the issue of punitive damages would additionally alleviate the
292
threat of bankruptcy experienced by defendants.
In addition to the presence of a limited fund, these pragmatic considerations also apparently prompted the district
court in Dalkon Shield to certify the Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class for
punitive damages. The court stated that individual adjudications would "result in a tedium of repetition lasting well into
the next century" 29 3 and that "the class action is the best
available device to protect the interests of all parties. ' 294 Utilizing the Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class action for punitive damages in
the mass tort context furthers the practical goals of class
actions and makes the civil procedure system more responsive
to the needs of contemporary society. 295 It allows the courts to

288. Dalkon Shield, supra note 4, 526 F. Supp. at 898. See Note, Class Certification,
supra note 1, at 1157.
289. Dalkon Shield, supra note 4, 526 F. Supp. at 892. See Advisory Comm. Note, 39
F.R.D. at 99; 7 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & KANE, supra note 124, § 1751. See also supra notes
120-24 and accompanying text.
290. Dalkon Shield, supra note 4, 526 F. Supp. at 897; Williams, 98 F.RD. at 333. See
supra note 73 and accompanying text.
291. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., M.D.L. No. 381, Memorandum and Pretrial Order No. 72, at 27; Dalkon Shield, supra note 4, 526 F. Supp. at 896; Wright &
Colussi, supra note 119, at 146-48.

292. Dalkon Shield, supranote 4, 526 F. Supp. at 897-98; Williams, 98 F.RD. at 333.
293. Dalkon Shield, supranote 4, 526 F. Supp. at 893.
294. Id. at 900. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., M.D.L No. 381, Memorandum and Pretrial Order No. 72, at 3, 10, 13.
295. Williams, 98 F.R.D. at 323-26, 336; Wright & Colussi, supra note 119, at 146-49.
See 7 C. WRIGHT. A. MILLEI & KANE, supra note 124, § 1751 (Supp. 1982). "It is now
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be innovative and flexible in their approach to accomplishing
the punishment and deterrent goals of punitive damages by
296
avoiding both overkill and relitigation.
Future Use of the Class Action for
Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Cases
In search of an equitable solution to the difficult question of
how to properly award punitive damages in mass tort cases,
three experienced federal district judges applied the class action
device. The first two cases were reversed; the third resulted in a
settlement. The future of this remedy in federal court is therefore
uncertain. The innovative trial judges in Dalkon Shield and
Skywalk are not particularly optimistic.
Judge Williams, who decided Dalkon Shield at the trial level,
cautions that mass tort class actions may be: "Going, going,
gone!"2 97 due to the Ninth Circuit's novel and restrictive interpretation of the limited fund provision of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) and its
misunderstanding of the terms of his order and the applicable
law. 298 He sees as a source of optimism, however, the willingness
of other courts to continue to certify classes in mass tort cases
and the growing impetus for class actions despite appellate
299
setbacks.
300
In Skywalk on remand, Judge Wright certified a Rule 23(b)(3)
class providing an opt out provision in deference to the Eighth
Circuit's concern that a mandatory class interferes (in the form
of an injunction) with the rights of litigants to pursue state court
claims. 3 1 Because state claims could be simultaneously litigated,
a Rule 23(b)(3) voluntary class action would not violate the Anti-

apparent that the increasing complexity and urbanization of modem American society
has tremendously magnified the importance of the class action as a procedural device for
resolving disputes affecting numerous people." Id.
296. Dalkon Shield, supra note 4,526 F. Supp. at 920-21. See 3B J. MOORE & KENNEDY,
supra note 121, 23.02[41 (Rule 23 class prerequisites should be liberally construed and
applied); Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence and Conflict of
Interest. 4 J. LEGAL STUD., 47 (1975) (courts should take an enlightened and pragmatic
approach to class actions).

297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
defined

Williams, 98 F.R.D. 323 (1983).
Id. at 334-35.
Id.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 95 F.R.D. 483 (W.D. Mo. 1982). This class was
as "all business invitees, or the representatives of business invitees, who were
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Injunction Act. The class claims were subsequently settled in
companion settlements in state and federal courts, 30 2 which had
the combined effect of a mandatory class because virtually all
class members were included in the settlement. 30 3 In a recent
publication, Judge Wright persists in his opinion that only a
mandatory Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class action can insure equity to all
parties. 30 4 He predicts, however, that because of the Eighth Circuit's interpretation of the Anti-Injunction Act, state courts will
be forced to shoulder the full responsibility for future mass tort
litigation. 30 5 While it is easy to sympathize with the frustrations
of Judges Williams and Wright, it is also apparent, as Judge Williams points out, that trial judges will continue to dare to be
innovative. Perhaps too, lessons will be learned as federal and
state courts all over the country grapple with Dalkon Shield and
other mass products liability cases.
If the Anti-Injunction Act prevents exclusive management of a
class action by a federal court, companion orders can be entered
in state and federal court in the same manner as settlements
were achieved in the Skywalk cases. Federal courts may find
state courts receptive to shared management responsibility of
class actions. Some state courts are more experienced in mass
tort litigation than the federal courts and equally as innovative.
For example, in Froud v. Celotex Corp.,30 6 the Illinois Appellate
Court affirmed a lower court's ruling in an asbestos case that
punitive damages were available under the Illinois Survival
Act. 30 7 This holding was subsequently reversed by the Illinois
Supreme Court based on its interpretation of the Act. 30 8 Al-

injured as a result of the collapse of the two skywalks at the Hyatt Regency Hotel of
Kansas City, Missouri on July 17, 1981." Id. at 485. See Wright & Colussi, supra note 119,
at 148.
302. In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 97 F.R.D. 380 (W.D. Mo. 1983).
303. Id.
304. Wright & Colussi, supra note 119, at 142-43. Judge Wright suggests that only a
mandatory class action would effectively manage the joint litigation to guarantee the
collective best interests of all the litigants. Id. at 144-47.
305. Id. at 143.
306. 107 Ill. App. 3d 654, 437 N.E.2d 910 (1982), rev'd on other grounds, 98 Ill. 2d 324,
456 N.E.2d 1316 (1983). See supra note 65.
307. 107 Ill. App. 3d at 658, 437 N.E.2d at 913. In Froud, the administrators of the

estates of three deceased asbestos workers sought recovery for punitive damages for
injuries allegedly caused by exposure to asbestos products manufactured and sold by
twenty-four companies. Id. at 656-57, 437 N.E.2d at 911-12. Recovery was sought under
the Illinois Survival Act. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 1101/2, § 27-6 (1983).
308. Froud v. Celotex Corp., 98 Ill. 2d 324, 456 N.E.2d 1316 (1983) (holding that com-
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though Froud was not a class action, the defendant, fearing
numerous punitive damages claims in asbestos cases, had raised
the issue of the propriety of awarding punitive damages in the
context of mass tort litigation. The subsequent comments of the
appellate court and its suggestions as to how to best deal with
punitive damages, when available in a mass tort case, evidences
the same willingness to be innovative exhibited in the Dalkon
30 9
Shield, Skywalk and Agent Orange cases.
The appellate court decision, written by Justice Francis Lorenz,
cited the district court opinion in Dalkon Shield to show that
courts can protect defendants in punitive mass tort cases from
"execution by punitive damages without granting them immunity from such damages." 3' 0 A concurring opinion by Justice
John J. Sullivan, a prominent trial lawyer before his ascension
to the bench, expresses his enthusiasm for utilizing the Dalkon
Shield concept of a separate trial "to award a single sum as
punitive damages for all plaintiffs, past and potential, with a
percentage to each based upon the compensatory damages
accrued." 31 1 Certainly other state courts will be of the same
mind. Both federal and state courts should recognize that the
class action is a method which should be used to equitably
award punitive damages in mass tort cases.
CONCLUSION

The resolution of the punitive damages issue through the use
of the 23(b)(1)(B) class action device as proposed by Judges Williams, Wright, and Weinstein would eliminate many of the problems generated by application of the punitive damages doctrine
in the mass tort context. It provides the mechanism by which all
punitive damages claims can be adjudicated in one forum by a
single action, which Judge Friendly foresaw as the solution to
the mass tort punitive damages problem in his prophetic footnote in Roginsky. 31 2 A class action on the issue of punitive damages will enable one court to determine the appropriate measure
of punishment which should be imposed on the defendant for his

mon law actions for punitive damages do not survive the death of the injured person

under the Illinois Survival Act).
309.
310.
311.
312.

107 Ill. App. 3d at 658-60, 437 N.E.2d at 913-15. See supranote 65.
107 II. App. 3d at 659, 437 N.E.2d at 914.
Id. (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
See supra note 95.
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conduct. In that proceeding, factors relevant to the issue of punitive damages such as the nature of the defendant's conduct and
the extent of the defendant's wealth can be considered. The court
can then arrive at a total amount of punitive damages which, in
light of all the circumstances, will adequately punish the defendant for his misconduct and deter the defendant and others from
similar conduct in the future. In this manner, the objectives of
punitive damages will be served.
Classwide adjudication will eliminate the danger of overkill
which is present with separate punitive damages judgments.
The court will be aware of the defendant's total wealth and can
achieve the goal of punishing the defendant without destroying
him financially. Accordingly, the constitutional due process
problems raised by repeated punishment for the same conduct
will be avoided.
Just as the defendant will benefit from classwide adjudication
of punitive damages, plaintiffs will also benefit. They will no
longer have to worry about beating other plaintiffs to the courthouse in order to recover punitive damages. A class action adjudication on punitive damages liability will result in a single
award which can then be divided on a pro rata basis among the
entire class of claimants. In addition, attorneys who represent
more than one plaintiff will not have to decide which plaintiff's
claim to pursue first.
The class action procedure is far superior to any of the available traditional methods for controlling the amount of punitive
damages in mass tort cases. Remittitur and jury instructions
may be inadequate in mass tort litigation because neither judges
nor juries can predict the outcome of all pending cases. In contrast, a mandatory class action device will make such attempted
predictions unnecessary.
Finally, the class action device enables courts to make the civil
procedure system more responsive to the needs of contemporary
society. Because many people come into contact with defective
products or suffer injuries as a result of disasters and catastrophic
accidents, their common interest in an equitable resolution of
their claims require the courts to effectively meet their needs.
Modern corporate defendants who are subject to potential financial devastation resulting from multiple punitive damages awards
also need the courts to fairly respond to their interests. A proper
interpretation of Rule 23(b)(1)(B), the "limited fund" class action
approach, will afford federal courts sufficient flexibility to accom-
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plish efficient adjudication of punitive damages claims. Similar
application of state court class action devices will also advance
the interests of plaintiffs and defendants. The class action, therefore, provides the procedural vehicle which can alleviate the problems created by punitive damages in mass tort cases.

